Radical Empiricism as Phenomenology without Methodical Epoché:
The "Sein und Nichts" Question in William James
We call into question the apparent absence in James of "phenomenological reduction," which is regarded as an indispensable procedure for obtaining the "phenomenological given." Our study of the early James's thought shows that it is rather how to "return to the natural attitude" that was an urgent problem for James, who had to struggle with the problem of what he called the "reductive." What occasions this Jamesian "reduction" is the inevitable presence of the "other" or a "more" in experience: synonyms for "horizon" in Jamesian terminology. In Jamesian philosophy, the relationship between "theoretical" and "practical" rationalities cannot be a matter of one-way transition from the former to the latter. Under this "ontological" light James begins to appear, not simply as a phenomenological "forerunner," but as a critical "co-explorer," alongside of Merleau-Ponty, of our "pre-reflective" ground that sustains us at the perilous limit of human reason.
2008 SAAP discussion paper submission
Radical Empiricism as Phenomenology without Methodical Epoché:
The "Sein und Nichts" Question in William James
A phenomenological "James Renaissance" can be considered to have been prepared by Husserl himself, who alludes to James toward the end of The Crisis:
W. James was alone, as far as I know, in becoming aware of the phenomena of horizon ¾ under the title of "fringes"¾ but how could he inquire into it without the phenomenologically acquired understanding of intentional objectivity and of implication?
As if in response to Husserl's acknowledgment of James's phenomenological acuity, a number of comparative studies have already demonstrated James's considerable influence on Husserl. For our part, however, we wish to "bracket" the already firmly substantiated results of those comparative studies and to start anew by meditating on the implications of Husserl's puzzlement over James's opening of the phenomenological field.
The problem of the "motivation for the phenomenological reduction in Husserl" is one of the major questions that go straight to the heart of Husserlian phenomenology. What is it that motivated Husserl to perform the "phenomenological reduction" in such an unremitting manner? To explain it in terms of methodological requirement does not seem to exhaust all there is to it when we consider the fact that Husserl eventually came to compare a radical performance of reduction to a "religious conversion."
Seen in this light, to ask the question of the "motivation for reduction" means to ask, not only about its methodological import, but also about the existential significance that is bound to pervade so deeply the performer's whole being as to awaken him to a radically new consciousness of the human experience as "being-in-the world." By the same token, Husserl's wonderment at the opening of the phenomenological field in James invites us to take Husserl's question, not as a rhetorical question posed to merely highlight James's originality, but as a searching light with which to explore the internal dynamics which has proved capable of opening up new "horizons" in philosophy by dint of the very notion of "horizon."
When James presents "phenomenological" descriptions of experience, he becomes engaged in the act of describing offhand, it seems to us, without going through the preliminary procedure of performing an "epoché" considered indispensable in Husserlian phenomenology to obtain "phenomenologically reduced" states of consciousness.
As a matter of fact, however, one of James's early works shows unmistakable signs of the fact that, quite early in his career, James was confronted with the problem of the reflective "reduction," though naturally not exactly in the "phenomenological" sense of the term as defined by Husserl. It is an essay which appeared in an issue of Mind in 1879 under the title, "The Sentiment of Rationality." The critical importance that James himself attached to this essay is shown in a letter addressed to Josiah Royce, where James refers to this essay as the "only decent thing I have ever written."
James begins the essay by posing a few fundamental questions: "What is the task which philosophers set themselves to perform? And why do they philosophize at all?"
James suggests it is because philosophers "desire to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the whole be more rational than the rather fragmentary and chaotic one which everyone by gift of nature carries about with him under his hat." And James goes on to ask: what is the most significant, "subjective" mark of rationality which tells the philosopher that his objective has been attained?
According to James, it is the "sentiment of rationality" which consists in the "feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its absoluteness¾¾this absence of all need to explain it, account for it or justify it." However, no sooner has a "sentiment of rationality" been attained by the theoretical mind than it is to be dispelled by the hard-dying, skeptical breath of the inquisitive mind itself. The "sentiment of rationality" cannot remain "stable" so long as the theoretical mind remains faithful to its own nature; namely, its inveterate urge to explore the unknown terrain a step further: the mind is "wedded to the process of seeing an other beside every item of its experience."
And the "reductive" is the name James employed to refer to this eternal "other" or the "beyond" for the reflective mind. ; the "reductive" of a mass of thought is the "further considerations which supervene and make [it] relative or derationalize [it]." This haunting "other," which functions to "reduce" the complacent sentiment of rationality to the insecurity of wavering uncertainty, can appear under a variety of guises depending on the object of "rational" commitment in question. James enumerates them:
The reductive of absolute being is thus nonentity, or the notion of an aliter possibile which it involves. The reductive of an absolute physics is the thought that all material facts are representations in a mind...The reductive of absolute knowledge is the constant potentiality of doubt, the notion that the next thought may always correct the present one ¾ resulting in the notion that a noumenal world is there mocking the one we think we know. Whatever we think, some reductive seems in strict theoretic legitimacy always imminently hovering over our thought ready to blight it....
We can see that the Jamesian notion of the "reductive" ranges over a variety of, so to speak, "anti-thetical" perspectives which function to "relativize" our beliefs and to deprive them of the "familiar" semblance of "absolute" certainty. For James, the "absolute" character of a thought consists in its "familiarity" for us. James maintains:
The Absolute is what has not yet been transcended, criticised or made relative. So far from being something quintessential and unattainable as is so often pretended, it is practically the most familiar thing in life. Every thought is absolute to us at the moment of conceiving it or acting upon it. It only becomes relative in the light of further reflection.
Consequently, the role of the "reductive" can be played by any reflective gaze that is capable of shedding a skeptical light on one's world in such a way as to rob it of its "familiar," "rational" countenance. The reduction of apparently transcendent "material facts" to "representations in a mind" is only one of the forms that the "reductive" can take, though it clearly is a most sweeping and potent one. In this sense, the Jamesian notion of the "reductive" is, to say the least, far broader in meaning than the Husserlian notion of "phenomenological reduction": the latter is a methodological notion stringently focused on obtaining a field of "pure consciousness" as the "phenomenological residue" by means of "bracketing" the natural attitude's "general thesis" of the transcendent being of the world.
From a distinctly phenomenological point of view, however, there is something most noteworthy about this Jamesian notion of the "reductive." It is that "reductives" of rational thoughts are considered to have their common origin in the very nature of the thinking mind to seek an "other" beyond what has been established as "rational thoughts." Or, conversely, it is the "beyond" itself that sends bewitching glimpses to the mind to induce it to reflect back upon the "rationality" of its thoughts.
The upshot is that there is an unceasing, dynamic correlativity between the generation of "reductives" and the structurally inevitable presence of the "beyond" to a thought. And what James means by the "beyond" or an "other" ¾ now it should be almost redundant to add ¾ can be subsumed under the general heading of the notion of "horizon" in phenomenology.
Yet, one might regard the Jamesian notion of the "reductive" as nothing but a variant formulation of the typical experience which initiates one into philosophical thinking as such. Could we not dismiss the Jamesian notion of the "reductive" as a mere manifestation of another exercise in the universal experience of philosophic awakening through the "wondering doubt"? The answer should be a categorical "No." On the contrary, we have to remember that it is through this "universal" experience that many philosophers, especially "phenomenological" ones, have come to establish his own distinctive perspective and style in philosophy.
Then, what is the fundamental stance James adopted with regard to the phenomena opened up by "reductives"? Let us listen to James's answer in his own words: (Here James uses the "datum" to refer to what he calls the "Metaphysical Datum"; namely, the result of the mind's efforts to "rationalize" the world in such a way that "clearness and unity [may] join friendly hands.")
Theoretically the task of the philosopher, if he cannot reconcile the datum with the reductive by the way of identification à la Hegel, is to exorcise the reductive so that the datum may hold up its head again and know no fear. (my underline)
James goes on to list some of the formulas that he considers to have been proposed by philosophers to "exorcise the reductive."
Against the notion of antinomies: to introduce the "distinction between potentiality and actuality."
Against the notion of a "still higher degree of identity" employed by nominalists as a reductive to "discredit the self-identity of the same attribute in different phenomena": to challenge the nominalists to "show what the higher degree of sameness can possibly contain which is not already in the lower." etc.
"But if the philosopher fails to find a satisfactory formula of exorcism for his datum," ¾ James argues ¾ "the only thing he can do is to 'blink' the reductive at a certain point, assume the Given as his necessary ultimate, and proceed to a life whether of contemplation or of action based on that." (my underline) James considers that this holds true especially for the case of the notion of absolute "Nonentity" as an ontological possibility. He writes:
...[W]hen the notion of an absolute datum which is all is presented to it (the mind), it goes through its usual procedure and remains pointing at the void beyond, as if in that lay further matter for contemplation....and as that leads to no issue on the further side, back recoils the thought in a circle towards its datum again. But there is no logical identity, no natural bridge between nonentity and this particular datum, and the thought stands oscillating to and fro, wondering "Why was there anything but nonentity?..." and finds no end, in wandering mazes lost.
There is no theoretical "formula of exorcism" against this ontological "reductive" of the notion of Nonentity. We simply have to admit: here we are faced with the ultimate, impenetrable limit for theoretical rationality; in a nutshell, here is the end of the "horizon" for the theoretical mind.
For the mystical mind, however, this end of the "theoretical" horizon becomes the very place whence it flies up with the wings of imaginative yearning into the darkness "beyond." And James recognizes in the mystics' way an appealing possibility to dissolve, if not to resolve, the conundrum of the Being of Being. In the ecstatic vision of the divine provenance of the world's order, "[o]ntological emotion so fills the soul that ontological speculation can no longer overlap it and put her girdle of interrogation-marks around existence."
In spite of an irresistible attraction to the mystical, whole-hearted acceptance of Being as it is, which he would continue to feel all through his life, James's philosophic mind desists from surrendering itself to an unqualified reign of mystical imagination. Hence James's declaration:
But if men should ever all agree that the mystical method is a subterfuge without logical pertinency, a plaster, but no cure, that the Hegelian method is fallacious, that the idea of Nonentity can therefore neither be exorcised nor identified, Empiricism will be the ultimate philosophy.
Empiricism, as James understands it, is to be granted the status of the "ultimate philosophy," not because it is in possession of some "ultimate" truth, but because, on the contrary, it accepts Being as the "ultimate given" simply beyond human reason. In other words, Empiricism certainly notices the question of Being as the ultimate, unsurpassable horizon for the theoretical mind, but opts to "blink" it and to turn on its heel in order to keep treading on the earthly horizons whence the mystical mind has flown up. Thus, James virtually concludes "The Sentiment of Rationality" as follows:
With this we seem to have exhausted all the possibilities of purely theoretic rationality....
Nonetheless, the questions remain: what is the task of Empiricism as the "ultimate philosophy" after philosophy's confession of impotency in the face of the most potent reductive of all?; Is there any way to get out of this "cul de sac" of theoretical rationality? At the close of the article James proposes answering these questions, in a later work, by inquiring "what constitutes the feeling of rationality in its practical aspect." And the key to James's strategy for such an inquiry shall be to liberate human reason from the tower of "purely theoretical rationality" and to return it to the open field of active, practical life so that it may function with the "sense of ease and freedom" in the harmonious, triadic circle of "sensible impression," "feeling," and "motion."
The promised sequel would be published as an article entitled "Rationality, Activity and Faith" in The Princeton Review in 1882. Furthermore, as it turned out, when James gathered his early works into The Will to Believe in 1897, it was included as a major part of the article bearing the same title as the Mind article. This means that in James's corpus there are actually two articles entitled "The Sentiment of Rationality": the original article and the second version, which is an incorporation of the original article and the sequel to it.
These bibliographical notes are in order here because of the important changes made to the original article when it was incorporated with its sequel. The gist of the whole matter lies in the fact that the incorporation was not made without entailing a rather drastic abbreviation of the original text; indeed, about two-thirds of it was truncated.
Most importantly, the part where James explicates the notion of the "reductive," some formulas to "exorcise reductives," and the need to "blink the reductive" has been left largely unincorporated. It is not that these terms have disappeared completely. But the truncation does seem to have worked to veil the pivotal place constituted by this rather peculiar triad of conceptions in the formative process of Jamesian "phenomenology."
Does the editorial omission imply the author's low regard for the ideas contained in the part omitted? This does not seem to be the case. Their critical significance can be ascertained by the way they appear in an even earlier piece of writing by James. In "Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind," one of the earliest book reviews, written at least four years before the publication of the Mind article, the problems concerning the "reductive" are already treated by James in almost exactly the same terms as in the Mind article.
This 10-page review, written by James at the age of 33, of a book by a now forgotten philosopher, George Henry Lewes, is illuminating in two respects. On the one hand, it reminds us of the critical importance of the tradition of British Empiricism as one of the historical contexts from which Jamesian philosophy emerged. In short, we see that the theme of "reduction" itself was not at all a unique preoccupation of James's in the philosophic community of the time. On the contrary, it seems to have been a predominant concern for a number of British philosophers: Perry writes of Lewes that "[h]e made a free use of that device so popular in recent times, the reduction, namely, of differences of entity to differences of relation or 'aspect.'"
On the other hand, however, the distinctive character of what might be called the "Jamesian meditation on the problem of reduction" stands out in bold relief all the more clearly against such a historical background. Here is the way James concludes his book review after having gone through Lewes's arguments in terms of the "reductive" and the philosopher's motive to "exorcise the reductive":
...We may conclude, therefore, that ever-sprouting reflection, or skepticism, just as it preys on all other systems, may also in strict theoretic legitimacy prey upon the ultimate data of Mr. Lewes's Positivism taken as a whole....To this reduction by a plus ultra, Mr. Lewes can only retort by saying, "Foolishness! So much ontologic thirst is a morbid appetite." But in doing this he simply falls back on the act of faith of all positivisms....
Skepticism, or unrest, in short, can always have the last word. After every definition of an object, reflection may arise, infect it with the cogito, and so discriminate it from the object in se. This is possible ad infinitum. That we do not all do it is because at a certain point most of us get tired of the play, resolve to stop, and assuming something for true, pass on to a life of action based on that.
We wish that Mr. Lewes had emphasized this volitional moment in his Positivism. Although the consistent pyrrhonist is the only theoretically unassailable man, it does not follow that he is the right man. Between us and the universe, there are no "rules of the game." The important thing is that our judgments should be right, not that they should observe a logical etiquette. There is a brute, blind element in every thought which still has the vital heat within it and has not yet been reflected on. Our present thought always has it, we cannot escape it, and we for our part think philosophers had best acknowledge it, and avowedly posit their universe, staking their persons, so to speak, on the truth of their position...What is this but saying that our opinions about the nature of things belong to our moral life? (my underlines)
We can ascertain that what sets the "Jamesian meditation" apart from the then "popular" mode of "reduction" is the very entanglement of its strongly "ontologic" urge and the accompanying realization of the vital importance of the "unreflected" for human existence.
If one should still find this "ontologic" James to be too much out of line with "James the pragmatist," it will suffice to point out that, in a letter addressed to Charles Renouvier about a year after writing the review of Lewes's book, the following statement is found:
After your Essays, it seems to me that the only important question is the deepest one of all, the one between the principle of contradiction, and the Sein und Nichts.
In terms of simple logic, the binary opposition of "Sein und Nichts" can be reduced to an opposition of "A" and "non-A." When logically reduced to its bare form, however, it becomes clear that there is no logical ground for either of the two terms to be preferred to the other. Nonetheless, in actuality, the world does exist as if "Sein" has been chosen over utter "Nichts" for some reason in compliance with the principle of contradiction. This "blank form of a logical reductive pure and simple" brings us the overpowering realization that this "some reason" is bound to remain unknown and unknowable to human reason; this is what James refers to as the "only important question."
Though the above passage reads as if James owed his realization of the importance of the "Sein und Nichts" problem wholly to Renouvier's work, James's "ontologic" brooding seems not so much a graft as an autochthonous breed. Actually a passage in "The Sentiment of Rationality" betrays that James's "ontologic thirst" far exceeded, at least in its urgency and persistence, that of his most admired master, namely, Renouvier. In the context where James explains the need to "blink the reductive at a certain point," he alludes to Renouvier as follows:
Such also is the attitude of all hard-minded analysts and Verstandesmenschen. Renouvier and Hodgson, the two foremost contemporary philosophers, promptly say that of experience as a whole no account can be given, but do not seek to soften the abruptness of the confession or reconcile us with our impotence.
Under the guise of a factual observation, James is actually intimating that he finds "Verstandesmenschen" like Renouvier choosing to "blink" the ultimate reductive too easily and too definitively. In a sense, however, this can be taken as a rather peculiar gesture on the part of James. Is it not James himself who understands better than anybody else the "practical" need to "blink" the ultimate reductive? Does James think that there is something reproachable about the "hard-minded" manner of "Verstandesmenschen," who dispose of this ultimate reductive, impervious to any "formula of exorcism"?
We can recognize a certain ambivalence in James's stance toward this problem of the ontological "reductive," which indicates that the relationship between "theoretical" rationality and "practical" rationality cannot be a matter of one-way transition from the former to the latter, or of a definitive subsumption of the former in the latter, notwithstanding James's own ostensible contention to the contrary. And it is such an ambivalence in James that seems ultimately responsible for the "puzzlement" which a number of people have confessed feeling over the Jamesian tenet of the "will to believe."
On the one hand, despite the apparently negative and "escapist" impression which the Jamesian call "to exorcise the reductive" evokes, it is not merely an theoretical dead-end that James sees in the ontological reductive. Once having peered hard into the nocturnal gaze of the ultimate "reductive" suffusing even the whole expanse of the azure vault, it should become impossible for the Empiricist to "reduce" it to complete oblivion. Even if he chooses to "blink" it and to turn his back on it in the course of his mundane life, he will come to himself once in a while to sense the eternal, ubiquitous gaze of the ultimate "reductive" set upon his back. James writes:
"Existence will be a brute Fact to which as a whole the emotion of ontologic wonder shall rightfully cleave, but remain unsatisfied. This wonderfulness or mysteriousness will then be an essential attribute of the nature of things, and the exhibition and emphasizing of it will always continue to be an ingredient in the philosophic industry of the race. Every generation will produce its Job, its Hamlet, its Faust or its Sartor Resartus."
On the other hand, however, it remains true that we cannot help but "blink the reductive," if not definitively, to engage in practical life. How intimately this realization is related to James's well-known mental crisis is revealed by a diary entry made about one year after he had finally found a way to overcome the crisis in the Renouvier's voluntaristic philosophy.
Yesterday I told Eliot I would accept the anatomical instruction for next year, if well enough to perform it, and would probably stick to that department. I came to this decision mainly from the feeling that philosophical activity as a business is not normal for most men, and not for me....Of course my deepest interest will as ever lie with the most general problems. But as my strongest moral and intellectual craving is for some stable reality to lean upon, and as a professed philosopher pledges himself publicly never to have done with doubt on these subjects, but every day to be ready to criticize afresh and call in question the grounds of his faith of the day before, I fear the constant sense of instability generated by this attitude would be more than the voluntary faith I can keep going is sufficient to neutralize...A "philosopher" has publicly renounced the privilege of trusting blindly, which every simple man owns as a right. (my underlines)
James confesses frankly that he cannot possibly live in the philosopher's world as an individual human being. But we ought not to take this confession of James's as demonstrative of the unthorough-going nature of his actual acts of philosophizing. Rather it attests to how chaotic was the crisis of philosophical skepticism into which James was half-irresistibly dragged down.
Here we are reminded that in Ideas Husserl discusses a mode of holding an object of consciousness as "merely thought" in terms of "neutrality modification," which is a unique, modified state of belief characterized by Husserl as very close to "epoché." It is a "modification which, in a certain way, completely annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related...."
For James, however, what is at stake in his struggles with the "reductive" is the "constant sense of instability" that must be "neutralized" by "voluntary faith" as it is exhibited clearly by the diary entry quoted above. If we are allowed to regard "epoché" broadly as a methodological "neutralizing" of doxic beliefs, we may be justified to argue that, in Husserlian "epoché" and Jamesian "reductive," the dynamic vectors are pointed at opposite directions relative to the power of "belief." What "phenomenological" implication can we draw from it?
When a phenomenologist endeavors to perform an epoché, he faces a certain "resistancce." Indeed, some phenomenologists have recognized essential, human significance in this "resistance" and set it at the center of their phenomenological inquiries.
Husserl himself, who upheld the "Cartesian way" for decades, eventually found it phenomenologically deficient as he came to realize the irrecusable status of the "life-world" as the ever-present correlate of the pre-reflective consciousness.
Schutz thematized the "epoché of epoché" dominant in the natural attitude; we are unreflectively committed to our "beliefs" in everyday life where everything is taken to be going on as usual "until further notice."
And for Merleau-Ponty, the "most important lesson which the reduction teaches us" is the "impossibility of a complete reduction," which paradoxically reveals the bonds of complicity between human existence and the world. He states:
The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen Fink Husserl's assistant when he spoke of "wonder" in the face of the world. Reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of the consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice. (my underlines)
For James, there was no "methodological" need for him to thematize "epoché" since he was, as it were, a habitual, half-unwilling performer of "epoché." On the contrary, what confronted James as a person was the urgent, practical task to bail out of the unstable sense of the world or the anxiety of life caused by it. Though James's so-called "morbid" sensitivity has been no secret among scholars, we can now see that it was inherently related to the problem of the "reductive" James was confronted with. In this regard, it is emblematic that in "The Sentiment of Rationality" James coined the name of "ontological wonder sickness" for the metaphysical "uneasiness" that persistently impels the reflective mind into philosophical vigil.
However, it is not our ultimate objective simply to point out a hitherto unnoticed, inherent relationship between the "sick-soul" inside James and the opening of the field of phenomenological inquiry by him. James was far more "normal" or "healthier" than "normal people" to the extent that he was capable of fighting against a much graver sense of "metaphysical" insecurity than the one which "normal people" ever know of. Rather it is in this "phenomenological" light that we would like to re-interpret Perry's simple but apt characterization of James as a "strong man overtaken by weakness."
To conclude, it is the irreplaceable importance of the "pre-reflective" level of the self's "spontaneous" attachment to the world that James "discovered" as a forerunner of phenomenological exploration. Such Jamesian exhortation to acknowledge the "unreflective" ground of our existence or the "impulse without reason" should not be taken as the last, defeatist outcries of philosophical irrationalism. Rather it attests to how intimately and painfully James knew what could sustain us at the perilous limit of human reason through his own struggles with the problem of the "reductive" and the experience of the mental crisis entangled with it.
It is the "spontaneous" nature of our existence that is always and already sustaining our "self" by pervading the life-world with its "self-evident" familiarity. If the "bottom of Being is left opaque to us," the only remaining way for us to reconcile ourselves with Being shall be to acknowledge and try to foster our "natural," "spontaneous" trust in Being, which James did under the name of the "will to believe."
 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970) p. 264.
 Ibid., p. 264.
 The Letters of William James, 2 vols., edited by Henry James (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920) vol. I, p. 203.
 Collected Essays and Reviews, edited by Ralph B. Perry (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), p.83.
 Ibid., p. 85.
 Ibid., p. 129.
 Ibid., p. 126.
 Ibid., p. 129.
 Ibid., p. 130.
 Ibid., p. 129.
 Ibid., p. 124.
 Ibid., p. 130.
 Ibid., p. 132.
 Ibid., pp. 126-127
 Ibid., p. 133.
 Collected Essays and Reviews, pp. 134-135.
 Ibid., p. 135.
 Ibid., p. 136.
 Ibid., p .4.
 Ralph B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James 2 vols.(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935), vol. I, p. 592.
 Collected Essays and Reviews, pp. 9-11.
 The Letters of William James, vol. I, p. 187.
 Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 9.
 Ibid., p. 133
 Ibid., p. 135
 The Thought and Character of William James, vol. I, pp. 343-344.
 Husserl, Ideas, translated by Fred Kersten (Hague: Nijhoff, 1982) p. 257.
 Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. xiv.
 Ibid., p. xiii.
 The Will to Believe (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 72.
 The Thought and Character of William James, Vol. I, p. 324.
 Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 128.