2007 SAAP Annual Meeting Panel Proposal

  

Statesmen of Ideas:

 

Aristotle and the American Pragmatists

 

Submitted: September 1st, 2006

 

Panel Abstract

 

With the possible exception of Charles Darwin, no thinker captures the creative imagination of American pragmatists and naturalists as powerfully as Aristotle.  His ancient voice resonates with and is renewed by the thinking of, among others, Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey, and John Herman Randall, Jr..  Randall thought of Aristotle as statesman of ideas, which he described this way: “[a]t his proudest the philosopher is the statesman of ideas, constructing in his novel synthesis a new constitutional framework within which men can henceforth conduct their altered lines of thinking.”[1]  If Aristotle’s thinking was the novel synthesis of the fertile ancient Greek mind, the appropriation of Aristotelian ideas, and most importantly, of the spirit of Aristotelian thinking by the American pragmatists marks the establishment of a new constitutional framework from which original lines of thinking firmly grounded in the thinking of the past may be developed.  In attending to the ways Peirce, Dewey and Randall read Aristotle, this panel seeks to articulate innovative lines of thinking about ontology, language and the relationship between human-being and the natural world in which it finds itself.

The first paper, Addressing the Possibility of Future Memory, is oriented by the perplexing relationship between finite human-being and the infinite possibilities of experience.  In addressing this question, Peirce draws heavily on the Aristotelian notion of tyche, or chance, and on the concept of synechism, or the doctrine of continuity.  These two concepts are shown to be intimately related to Peirce’s understanding of infinitesimals, which intends, among other things, to capture the ever-diversifying possibilities in nature.  This understanding of infinitesimals is then drawn into comparison with Aristotle’s treatment of to apeiron, the indefinite or infinite.  By bringing Peirce’s conception of infinitesimals to bear on Aristotle’s conception of to apeiron, this paper deepens our understanding of Peirce’s insistence that Aristotle recognized germinal being, an “esse in futuro” that opens the possibility of understanding the relation of human-being to the natural world in terms of what Peirce calls “future memory.”

Future memory grows out of the human experience of the unbounded capacity for expression exhibited by things.  The second paper, The Saying of Things: Toward a Phenomenological Naturalism, turns its attention to the American tradition of naturalism and brings it into dialogue with Heideggerian phenomenology in order to set forth a rigorously naturalistic understanding of the relationship between human logos and the unbounded capacity for expression exhibited by natural being.  By drawing the thinking of Woodbridge, Dewey and Randall, each of whom recognized the importance of Aristotle’s naturalistic conception of language, into relation to Heideggerian phenomenology, this paper seeks to articulate an understanding of logos as naturally bound up with being even as being always remains provocatively elusive.  Phenomenological naturalism names the proper comportment logos must have toward being if it is to be capable of responding in ways that do justice to the plurivocal sayings of things.

The third paper, How Randall Used the Past: Reinterpreting Aristotle and Reconstructing Substance, deepens our understanding of the importance of attending to and learning from the ways things speak.  The direct and intimate, albeit it always socially and culturally mediated, human involvement with nature is understood in this paper as an “exacting tutelage” from which philosophy must learn if it is to resist becoming seduced by abstraction, aloof from the world and ultimately irrelevant.  John Hermann Randall, Jr.’s articulation of the meaning of substance is a paradigm example of what is possible for philosophy if it remains attuned to the exacting tutelage of nature.  In a rigorous reconstruction of Randall’s too often ignored rehabilitation of the traditional notion of substance, this paper sets forth an understanding of substance that undermines the simplistic dualism between substantialist and process ontologies.  In so doing, this paper at once draws us back to a reconsideration of Aristotle’s naturalism and forward to a novel line of thinking about human-being in its relation to nature.

 


 

Addressing the Possibility of Future Memory:

How Peirce Interpreted Aristotle’s Naturalism

 

Pragmatism tends to emphasize two ways of thinking.  First, pragmatism holds that experience is always open-ended.  No matter how long we go down the path of inquiry, we do not anticipate a dead-end or closure of living and evolving history.  Future possibilities are unlimited and literally inexhaustible.  Second, pragmatism takes human finitude seriously.  An inquirer never assumes infinite intelligence or perfected knowledge within her reach.  Ends are finite, and even God is no longer considered infinite, at least in the traditional sense.

A question, however, arises.  On what grounds would one say that within the bound of finite human experience she still expects infinite possibilities for the wide-open future?  What is the strict sense in which genuine novelty and creativity endlessly enter into the world?  To borrow a phrase from R. Rorty, how do we know that we shall never get “tired and unimaginative?”  In this regard infinite possibilities of future discourse, of hermeneutic re-interpretability, or of artistic creativity, seem to call for some explanation, when contrasted with the characteristically pragmatist understanding of human beings as finite inquirers.

Charles S. Peirce, among others, considered this problem most earnestly.  As widely acknowledged, Peirce was committed to the infinite community of inquirers, which influenced the late Royce in many ways, while never rejecting the view that inquirers are always finite inquirers.  His concern is well-expressed in a brief remark on pragmatism as defined by William James and F.  C. S. Schiller: “I do not deny the truth of the doctrine as defined by James; only I think it fails to go to the root of the matter.  The most decided objection I have to the teaching of James and Schiller is that they seem to deny all infinity, including an infinite being” (MS 318, 1907, emphases added).  Clearly, Peirce sees a potential problem here.

As Peirce and Royce would agree, this is not a trivial problem.  On their view, and this is particularly clear in The Problem of Christianity in the case of Royce, human-beings are necessarily involved in the ever-expanding fabric of interpreters that so vastly comprehends both natural and human history.  The community of self-conscious interpreters together with their language occupies a small part of the entire semiotic universe.  But what is the nature of this universe?  Peirce says that for a human-being “his interpretant is the future memory of his cognition, his future self, or another person he addresses, or a sentence he writes, or a child he gets” (undated, emphases added).  Thus addressing the possibility of future memory, which will certainly become part of our history, is not a trivial issue for Peirce. 

This orientation toward futurity is reflected in Peirce’s interpretation of Aristotle, when he writes: “The doctrine of Aristotle is distinguished from substantially all modern philosophy by its recognition of at least two grades of being.  That is, besides actual reactive existence, Aristotle recognizes a germinal being, an esse in potential or I like to call it an esse in futuro”(1903, first emphasis added).  Accordingly, the interpretive strategy Peirce takes is to unfold the layers of Aristotelian naturalism embedded in the Physics and the Metaphysics, which recognizes matter not as dead and inert but instead as indefinite being pregnant with future potentialities.

Turning to a more specific relationship between Peirce and Aristotle regarding this issue, the mature view of Peirce comprises two fundamental doctrines of tychism and synechism.  As the etymology strongly suggests, these doctrines can be traced back to Aristotle’s notions of tychê (chance) and synécheia (continuity) studied by Aristotle in the Physics and the Metaphysics, which demonstrate the straightforward significance of Aristotle in Peirce’s thought.  By the term chance, Peirce intends to mean absolute chance, for which any mechanistic account would eventually fail.  The term continuity involves multiple meanings – explained further below – but the main point is that continuity is operative everywhere in nature, whose outward or observable consequences are epitomized in the operations of natural laws. 

Peirce’s doctrine of absolute chance, namely tychism – which William James found not only interesting but “vitally important” – is a direct descendent and extension of Aristotle’s notion of tychê in the Physics, Book II, chapters 4 through 6.  Not only that, Peirce considers this doctrine of absolute chance as one of the most significant characteristics of Aristotelianism.  In contrast to the traditional emphasis on the permanency and fixism of Aristotlian philosophy, Peirce highlighted the theory of uncaused becoming in Aristotle’s Physics, and thus characterized Aristotle’s philosophy as “essentially evolutionary” (emphasis added).  In fact Peirce argues that “tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth” (emphasis added).

Accordingly, once an archetype of tychism is identified in Aristotle’s work, it is natural for Peirce to attribute evolutionism to Aristotle.  It can be observed from this that the founder of pragmatism interprets Aristotle in a fairly dynamic way, not holding Aristotle responsible for a worldview of a perfected, finished, or fixed universe.  Since evolutionism played a crucial role in the formation of classical pragmatism, the significance of the notion of tychê in Aristotle is indubitable.  The basic relationship between Aristotle’s notion of tychê and Peirce’s tychism will be explained further in the actual paper.

In contrast to tychism, Peirce’s doctrine of continuity, namely synechism, is not a direct descendent of the Aristotelian legacy.  The reason is simple.  Peirce’s understanding of continuity is far more complicated and sophisticated than that of Aristotle.  However, as Peirce’s view matured under the influence of G. Cantor, a German mathematician Peirce admired, his view comes closer to that of Aristotle in an interesting way.  Peirce inherits the following (partial) definition of continuity from Aristotle: whatever is continuous should contain all the common limits of its adjacent parts.  This property Peirce called Aristotelicity.  The terminology itself speaks for the immediate relevance of Aristotle in Peirce’s synechism.  In fact as Peirce points out, a similar (or at least germinal) notion of continuity can be found in the actual text of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics

While Peirce’s synechism involves much more than what Aristotle originally stated, there is good reason to think that Aristotelicity becomes crucially important for Peirce, since this notion reflects Peirce’s deeper understanding of the Cantorian or set-theoretic conception of continuity.  In particular, Peirce discovers that Aristotelicity has a counterpart in Cantor’s language of sets and transfinite numbers.  The actual paper will thus illustrate why Aristotelicity matters for Peirce, by explaining (1) how Aristotelicity was inherited from Aristotle, and (2) why Aristotelicity may take priority over the simpler property of infinite divisibility, which Peirce called, Kanticity.

As synechism develops still further, Peirce starts to diverge from Cantor by emphasizing that mathematical points are pure abstractions of thought.  As an alternative to thinking of a collection of discrete individual points – which correspond to individuated possibilities – Peirce now thinks that a true continuum should involve potential points, not only actual points, where potentiality drastically outruns actuality.  A true continuum considered in this direction has no definite cardinality but is regarded as being capable of yielding infinitely many possibilities.  On his account points do not actually exist in a continuum but should be regarded as potential beings.  From this Peirce draws analogies between his ontology of absolute chance in nature, namely tychism, and his theory of infinitesimals, where infinitesimals are meant to designate the indefinite spectrum of potential points or possibilities prior to individuation in existence.

The theory of infinitesimals, on the other hand, still reveals some indications of Aristotelian thought.  The general view Peirce has is that the parts of true continua are no longer discrete points but are infinitesimals, indefinitely overlapping and merging with each other.  Such a view is in some measure reminiscent of the conception of tò ápeiron (the infinite) in Aristotle’s writings, since the infinite is regarded by Aristotle as a quasi-material scheme related to the temporal becoming in the natural world.  The infinite is not only indefinite and (always) incomplete for Aristotle but is also said to be contained in the details of the world rather than containing the world.  The actual paper thus probes for the Aristotelian grounds of esse in futuro and hence the possibility of future memory mentioned earlier.  It seeks to illustrate the source of unbounded express-ability of things as well as the endless interpret-ability of their sayings, which have always been indispensable elements in the tradition of naturalistic pragmatism.

As already stated at the outset, the question concerning such an ontology of possibilities is not confined to Peirce scholarship, for Peirce is not coping with a peculiar problem of his own about the interplay between a potentially infinite community and finite human beings.  “Ends are,” Dewey says for example, “literally endless,” but why and how is this so?  Such a question would almost inevitably arise as long as we want an infinitely open future – which can hardly be dropped from pragmatism – while equally stressing the finitude of existence.  The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to give an account of how Peirce interpreted Aristotle’s naturalism – we may note that Peirce “read and thought more about Aristotle than about any other man” (MS 1604, 1894) – which, beyond doubt, helped Peirce form his own response to the proposed question through his very original appropriation of such central Aristotelian concepts as chance and continuity.

 


 

The Saying of Things: Toward a Phenomenological Naturalism

 

In his Confessions, Frederick J.F. Woodbridge identifies Aristotle as the thinker who most powerfully impressed upon him the importance of language for philosophy.  “Knowledge, with [Aristotle],” he writes, “is largely a matter of saying what things are. …And although truth is not a matter of nature, the saying of things is. …Existence is provocative.”[2]  The saying of things is natural in a twofold way corresponding to the pregnant ambiguity of the genitive that operates in the very formulation: “the saying of things.” Taken subjectively, the genitive points to the natural fact that things speak, that existence articulates itself.  Taken objectively, the genitive announces an insistent objectivity that, however elusive, still always also lends itself to articulation.  By nature, things speak and are spoken of: saying and being belong together. Existence is provocative by nature: in calling itself forth, it opens itself to articulate response.

This paper will concern itself primarily with the nature of this response to existence, with what might be called ontological response-ability: the ability to attend to the ways beings speak and to articulate responses that do justice to the saying of things.  Although Aristotle exemplifies a habit of thinking capable of responding to the many ways being is said, this hexis has long been buried under thick layers of scholastic sediment.  Yet, growing out of the robust philological return to the texts of Aristotle in the 19th century, two philosophical movements that came of age in the 20th century were able to hear in Aristotle the voice of genuine ontological response-ability.  Continental phenomenology, particularly the form in which it is articulated by Martin Heidegger, and American naturalism as developed by Woodbridge, John Dewey, and John Herman Randall, Jr., share a deep appreciation for Aristotle’s orientation to language.  Both phenomenology and American naturalism recognize the importance of Aristotle’s insistence that access to being is only possible in and through logos and that human logos belongs as much to being as being belongs to it.  Indeed, both philosophical movements hear in Aristotle’s approach to language a powerful, critical rejoinder to the central dichotomy of modern thinking that posits a rigid division between human-being and the being of nature.

For Heideggerian phenomenology, this division is manifest in the modern conception of subjectivity that cuts human-being off from the ontological context in which it finds itself.  Dasein is thus divorced from its world.  The entire analytic of Dasein in Being and Time is designed to deconstruct the vision of the subject as situated over against the world—indeed, the ultimate failure to complete the project set forth in Being and Time is due in large part to a residual tendency to think Dasein in terms associated with traditional modern philosophies of the subject.  While it is only with the so-called “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking in the early 1930’s that an approach to the question of being is articulated in a way that moves beyond the conceptual schema of modern subjectivism, already in the mid-1920’s, Heidegger’s intense engagement with the thinking of Aristotle and specifically with his approach to logos offers him the philosophical resources necessary to challenge the simple dichotomy between the subject and its object.

For the American naturalists, the modern tendency to segregate human-being from nature gives rise to a set of dichotomies of which they are highly critical.  The appeal to “naturalism” is explicitly intended to undercut the sorts of dualisms—between mind and body, form and matter, subject and object—that have historically given rise to the basic ontological and epistemological problems of the modern epoch: the mind/body problem, the question of the possibility of knowledge, the intense search for ultimate foundations.  Randall has characterized American naturalism as an attitude that is “at once antidualistic and antireductionist.”[3]  It seeks an integrated understanding of the complex reality of things and refuses to reduce the rich plurivocity of nature to anything simple.

This naturalistic attitude resonates with Heidegger’s phenomenological attempt to articulate the various ways beings appear and echoes the habit of Aristotelian thinking that seeks to trace the many ways being is said.  Indeed, in the famous formulation: “to on legetai pollachos”—“being is said in many ways,”[4] the morphology of the term “legetai” articulates a wonderful ambiguity of voice; for it can be understood passively in which case being is the object of the saying; or, it can be heard in the middle voice, in which case it is being that does the articulating.  Thus, like the genitive mentioned above, the appearance of the middle/passive form of the verb legesthai, which means to say or speak, points to an understanding of the very activity of articulation that precedes and indeed undermines the simple dichotomy between subject and object upon which so much modern thinking depends.

If, however, this naturalistic conception of logos and legesthai draws Heidegger and the American naturalists together toward Aristotle, the Americans, and Randall and Dewey in particular, remain fundamentally skeptical of the extent to which Aristotle himself actually accomplishes a rigorously naturalistic conception of language.  Dewey, for example, credits Aristotle with developing a naturalistic metaphysics, but criticizes him for ultimately surrendering to the fixed, the certain and finished.[5]  This penchant for stability, he suggests, led to a far too unsophisticated account of the relationship between discourse and being.  Thus, while Dewey praises the Greeks for their discovery of discourse as naturally related to being, he is critical of their failure to recognize the social and historical dimensions of discourse: “But they took the structure of discourse for the structure of things, instead of the forms which things assume under the pressure and opportunity of social cooperation and exchange.”[6]  Following Dewey, Randall claims at the end of his impressive volume entitled simply, Aristotle, that Aristotle’s “view of the relation of logos to things is far too simple.  Actually logos is highly selective, being relative to its context.”[7]

However, the judgment that Aristotle’s understanding of the relation of language to beings is far too simplistic begins to falter when Aristotle’s texts—in which the full complexity of his own subtle engagement with the articulations of being is enacted—are given priority over Dewey’s frequently insightful, but often too abstract polemic.  And although Randall offers a beautiful account of Aristotle’s conception of science as “right talking,” he fails to analyze in any detail Aristotle’s most explicit account of the meaning of logos and its relation to things in the De Interpretatione.

Heidegger, however, does engage the text of the De Interpretatione in a rigorous and original way.  In his first two lecture courses at the University of Marburg, Heidegger focuses his attention on this text and specifically on the meaning of logos apophantikos, the kind of declaratory saying that lets things show themselves as themselves.  Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of the De Interpretatione in these early lectures sets forth a much more nuanced conception of the relation of logos to things than either Dewey or Randall recognize.  In fact, Heidegger’s interpretation uncovers precisely the communal/social dimension of logos that Randall and Dewey find missing in Aristotle.  This line of interpretation is pursued further in Being and Time, Division I, Section V, entitled “Being-in as such,” in which Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to Aristotle’s conception of logos is further developed.  Here, we find Heidegger introducing a robust understanding of logos as embedded in the world; a conception of the relationship between logos and world that resonates with the naturalistic approach to communication found in Dewey and Randall.  Here, too, however, we find Heidegger distancing himself from a certain tendency in Aristotle to analyze logos in terms of an external “theory of judgment.”[8]

Thus, while Dewey and Randall locate in Aristotle the beginnings of a truly naturalistic understanding of logos, they believe him to have failed to appreciate fully the extent to which logos is determined in its relation to beings by strong historical, social and communal forces.  Heidegger’s phenomenological approach challenges this particular critique by uncovering the communal dimensions of logos apophantikos developed in De Interpretatione.  Nevertheless, Heidegger remains dissatisfied with Aristotle’s ultimate understanding of logos as a kind of binding or separating of representations, calling it an external conception and a failure to remain true to his original phenomenological point of departure.  Heidegger’s own development of logos as embedded in and responsive to the world bears a striking similarity to the naturalistic understanding of communication developed by Dewey in Nature and Experience.  By drawing American naturalism and Heideggerian phenomenology together into relation with Aristotle’s account of logos, this paper intends not only to uncover a more subtle and, indeed, timely understanding of logos in Aristotle, but also to open the possibility of developing a rigorously phenomenological naturalism that at once focuses philosophical attention on the concrete encounter with the things themselves and recognizes that this encounter is always inexhaustibly complex because ultimately determined by the natural context in which it occurs.  To begin articulating the contours of such a phenomenological naturalism will occupy the final section of the paper and serve as its ultimate purpose.


 

How Randall Used the Past:

Reinterpreting Aristotle & Reconstructing Substance

 

America has defined itself in relationship to nature in various senses and it has done so (as any nation or culture must) in the most concrete manner imaginable – a direct involvement with the natural world.  But the distinctively human relationship to nature in this instance as in every other such case is a culturally mediated one; so, too, the evolved and evolving culture (insofar as it is a viable culture) is a naturally sustained and nourished affair.  The exacting tutelage of such a direct involvement is one in which the complex interplay of causal relationships and human purposes – of physical things in their obdurate but also pliable character, of human life in its remarkable resilience but also tragic fragility – is pressed home.  Only a philosophy respectful of the lessons of such tutelage is likely to win a hearing, especially among those who refuse to become lost in philosophical abstractions and theoretical disputes utterly severed from human experience.  At the very least, philosophical naturalism is a systematic attempt to do the fullest justice to this exacting tutelage.

In a more directly and technically philosophical sense, various traditions of naturalism have informed and directed America’s attempts at self-understanding.  A dominant strand within the complex weave of American naturalism is itself a complex weave – the varieties of Aristotelianism articulated and defended by pivotal figures in the history of philosophical reflection in the United States (cf. John Ryder).  Among these creative appropriations of Aristotelian naturalism none is more subtle, informed, or (arguably) compelling than the distinctive version encountered in the writings of John Herman Randall, Jr.  One of the most distinctive features of Randall’s philosophical naturalism is the extent to which it thematizes history,  This feature is in effect announced in the title of what is likely his most important contribution to advancing American philosophy, Nature and Historical Experience.  If this work is read in light of his more programmatic and methodological works (e.g., How Philosophy Uses Its Past), on the one hand, and his more historical and exegetical ones (Plato: Dramatist of the Life of the Mind and Aristotle), on the other, one quickly gets a sense of just how important the Aristotelian framework is to the articulation of Randall’s historical naturalism.  While some of the most influential naturalists in the history of American philosophy (e.g., John Dewey and Justus Buchler) have rejected the notion of substance, one of the defining features of Randall’s historical naturalism is to reconstruct this traditional category in such a way as to undercut the dualism between a substantalist and process ontology.  In general, Randall’s unique form of philosophical naturalism deserves to be far better known than it is; and, in particular, his nuanced position concerning the central category in Aristotelian naturalism also merits the critical scrutiny of contemporary inquirers.  For the sake of these intertwined aims, then, the author of this paper will offer an overview of Randall’s historical naturalism, paying especially close attention to his debt to Aristotle, and then present the details of his attempt to reconstruct the category of substance.  Among other points of emphasis, the character of Randall’s philosophy as a self-consciously linguistic and historical undertaking will be stressed.  One of the benefits of stressing these facets of Randall’s naturalism is that such an approach invites, perhaps even compels, a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s own naturalism, one allowing us to see what so many have appeared to overlook or (at least) failed to appreciate – the central roles which language and history play in the actual conduct of Aristotle’s philosophical practice.  In this instance, we can discern quite clearly how Randall himself used the past, at once, tracing the unfinished trajectory of an intellectual inheritance and inviting a renewed, deepened understanding of a towering representative of philosophical naturalism.


 

 

 

 


 

[1]  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Randall</Author><Year>1963</Year><RecNum>665</RecNum><Pages> 27</Pages><record><database name="CPL.enl" path="C:\Documents and Settings\Chris Long\My Documents\Professional\EndNote\CPL.enl">CPL.enl</database><source-app name="EndNote" version="8.0">EndNote</source-app><rec-number>665</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Randall, John Herman</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How philosophy uses its past</style></title></titles><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">xiv, 106</style></pages><keywords><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History of Philosophy</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pragmatism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1963</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Columbia University Press</style></publisher><call-num><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">B52 .R25</style></call-num><urls></urls><research-notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Randall recognizes the the history of philosophy is wrapped up with cultural change, that philosophical concepts, problems and approaches are determined by the culture, social, political contexts in which they are found.  &quot;... it is impossible to gain any insight into the history of philosophical ideas -- into the historical dimensions of philosophizing -- without being led to formulate a philosophy of cultural change&quot; (20).  &quot;The history of philosophical ideas is both cumulative and original&quot; (20).  Social and cultural conflict drives philosophical minds to question basic assumptions -- this accounts for the career of philosophy (22).  The history of philosophy as dialogue:  We cannot accept the notion of a &quot;dialectic&quot; of intellectual history.  &quot;But we can still speak of a &apos;dialogue&apos; in which the future asks questions of the past embodied in the present, and the present replies--by generating a new philosophy&quot; (27).&#xD;&#xD;Philosopher at humblest: a politician of ideas.  Works to makes deals and compromises to effect a working agreement such that thinking can go on (27).  Philosopher at proudest: a statesman of ideas.  Constructs a new synthesis, new constitutional framework.  Aristotle belongs to this group, for R.&#xD;&#xD;The new ideas that provoke philosophy do not come from philosophy itself, &quot;they come from philosophic reflection on a changing intellectual and social world&quot; (35).  Historical patterns: no dialectical necessity, they are plural (37).  &#xD;&#xD;&quot;Metaphysical criticism&quot; -- appeals from some intellectual formulation to experience as actually lived (37-8).  Critique of abstraction from the encountered world; critique of the condemnation of ordinary experience in favor of a theory (39).  &quot;Phenomenalism&quot; it is called by Randall (39).  Aristotle is recognized as the founder of this: &quot;Aristotle invented what we call &apos;metaphysics&apos;, and what he himself called &apos;first philosophy&apos;, to criticize the &apos;separation&apos; by the Platonists of intelligible form or structure from the world of natural things or ordinary experience&quot; (41).  Aristotle did not criticize the Platonists genuine insight into forms, but their abstraction of it.  Metaphysical/phenomenological criticism &quot;always sets out from some determinate formulated scheme of understanding that prevails in the critic&apos;s culture&quot; (42).&#xD;&#xD;&quot;Experimental&quot; method: not empirical, which professes to start from immediate experience, experimental method &quot;always starts frankly from a whole antecedent body of ideas&quot; (42-3).  &quot;... experimental method assumes to begin with the funded body of knowledge already acquired in the past.  There can be no experimental method except in the context of an already tested store of beliefs and ideas&quot; (43).  The appeal to experience always comes with &quot;some codified experience of nature already won&quot; (43).  [</style><style face="bold" font="default" size="100%">Comment</style><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">: cf. Heidegger&apos;s hermeneutic circle, Gadamer&apos;s prejudice.]  Fresh experience is made intelligible always through values, concepts, etc. that are &quot;themselves the deposit of a ong experience with the world&quot; (44).  &quot;This can be summed up by saying, that for inquiry and criticism the &apos;immediate&apos; is never given, and that the appeal to experience is no starting-point, but an intermediate stage in the process of criticizing the reflective experience we do actually start with, that is, the experienced world already formulated in some scheme of interpretation&quot; (44).  None is able to free himself from inherited assumptions (45-6).  Metaphysical criticism is &quot;progressive, never finished, never reaching final conclusions&quot; (47).&#xD;&#xD;Philosophical tradition: enjoys a &quot;career&quot; (47).  There is a type of continuity, a life.  &quot;Whenever philosophic thinking has been vital, and not merely inherited, such traditions have been transformed&quot; (48).  Randall is convinced that philosophical traditions begin to converge as they work themselves out (69).  &#xD;&#xD;&quot;Our entire stock of intellectual resources is inescapably a heritage from the past: it is embodied history itself, the past alive in the present.  This past is a human achievement, the deposit of man&apos;s long intellectual wrestling with his world&quot; (77).  The scientist and the philosopher starts from a funded body of ideas: &quot;He starts as the heir of the results and achievements of a cumulative enterprise with a long past of previous inquiry behind it.  Aristotle knew that, and illustrates it himself.  But it was after him soon forgotten ...&quot; (78).  Philosophy &quot;is fundamentally a process of criticism, ever renewed, of the ideas men are using, in the interest of meeting novel intellectual problems&quot; (79).  [</style><style face="bold" font="default" size="100%">Comment</style><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">: This may be why we must call Aristotle the first historian of philosophy, for he turns to his predecessors nor for historical, but for philosophical reasons.]&#xD;&#xD;Randall says of Aristotle: he means the &quot;power of the analysis of language, of taking care how things can best be said; and he means also the danger of using language to define beforehand the structure of subject-matter, instead of to express the structure we discover by consulting nature&quot; (83).  [</style><style face="bold" font="default" size="100%">Comment</style><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">: I am not sure it is fair to say Aristotle analysizes language, language is used to get at the nature of things.  Also, R. presumes that Aristotle uses language to define the subject-matter before consulting nature; but this presumes an anachronistic conception of the relationship between language and nature such that language is an imposition upon nature.  Strange for one who has done so much to illustrate Aristotle&apos;s naturalism!]&#xD;&#xD;Aristotle&apos;s concern with his predecessors: notorious: &quot;he has a strong sense of the continuity of intellectual inquiry, and the first book of any of his writing is normally a kind of Platonic dialogue in which he argues with the &apos;ancients&apos;&quot; (86).  </style></research-notes></record></Cite></EndNote>John Herman Randall, How Philosophy Uses Its Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 27.

[2]  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite ExcludeYear="1"><Author>Woodbridge</Author><Year>1937</Year><RecNum>732</RecNum><Pages>24</Pages><record><database name="CPL.enl" path="C:\Documents and Settings\Chris Long\My Documents\Professional\EndNote\CPL.enl">CPL.enl</database><source-app name="EndNote" version="8.0">EndNote</source-app><rec-number>732</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Woodbridge, Frederick James Eugene</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amherst College.,</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">University of Minnesota.,</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Columbia University.,</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nature and mind : selected essays of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, presented to him on the occasion of his seventieth birthday by Amherst college, the University of Minnesota, Columbia university; with a bibliography of his writings</style></title></titles><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">x, 509</style></pages><keywords><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1937</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Columbia university press</style></publisher><call-num><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">B29 .W66</style></call-num><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge et al., Nature and Mind: Selected Essays of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 24.

[3]  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Randall</Author><Year>1944</Year><RecNum>691</RecNum><Pages>362</Pages><record><database name="CPL.enl" path="C:\Documents and Settings\Chris Long\My Documents\Professional\EndNote\CPL.enl">CPL.enl</database><source-app name="EndNote" version="8.0">EndNote</source-app><rec-number>691</rec-number><ref-type name="Book Section">5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Randall, John Herman</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Krikorian, Yervant Hovhannes</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Naturalism and the Human Spirit</style></secondary-title></titles><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">354-382</style></pages><keywords><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Naturalism.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1944</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Columbia university press</style></publisher><call-num><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">B828.2 .K7</style></call-num><urls></urls><research-notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This essay is largely a commentary on the essays found in the present volume, although with the desire to situate the meaning of naturalism historically and flesh out the meaning of naturalism for the present age (written in 1944).  Present day &quot;Naturalism&quot; takes nature as an all-inclusive category, but is against both reductionism and transcendentalism (357-8).  There is a continuity of analysis between the human and the natural, unlike the modern division between body and mind, the mechanistic and the spiritual.  Dewey gives voice to the notion that naturalism is </style><style face="italic" font="default" size="100%">against dualisms and gulfs</style><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"> (358).  Naturalism is not materialism, which is reductionistic.  For the new naturalist: &quot;The world is not really &apos;nothing but&apos; something other than it appears to be: it is what it is, in all its manifold variety, with all its distinctive kinds of activity&quot; (361).  Intellectual analysis can discriminate hitherto unknown factors and structures, but it does not destroy the subject matter it sets out to explore (362).&#xD;&#xD;Randall gives a kind of history of naturalism beginning with the Greeks: the world exhibits a </style><style face="italic" font="default" size="100%">logos</style><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">, a rational structure or system, this structure lends itself to human discourse and understanding (369).  &quot;The Greek relation of man to his world is an intelligible interaction between an intelligent and valuing organism and an intelligible and valuable system of nature&quot; (370).  &quot;Man leads an existence, precarious, to be sure, but not impossible, in a universe that responds to his activities and is to be construed in terms appropriate to those activities&quot; (370).  Hellenism brings the denaturalization of human beings -- but Aquinas draws them together by insisting on the continuity between Man and Nature; no longer is there a gulf between body and soul, human and God.  Modernism begins another stage of denaturalization: Nature is purely mechanistically explicable, and so is radically different from the spirit or mind of the human (370-1).  Chasm yawns between Mind and Nature: human experience is removed from nature and made &quot;subjective&quot; (371).</style></research-notes></record></Cite></EndNote>John Herman Randall, "Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism," in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Yervant Hovhannes Krikorian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), 362.

[4] Metaphysics, VII.1 1028a10.

[5]  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Dewey</Author><Year>1958</Year><RecNum>706</RecNum><Pages>48</Pages><record><database name="CPL.enl" path="C:\Documents and Settings\Chris Long\My Documents\Professional\EndNote\CPL.enl">CPL.enl</database><source-app name="EndNote" version="8.0">EndNote</source-app><rec-number>706</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dewey, John</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Experience and nature</style></title></titles><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">443</style></pages><keywords><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dewey, John, 1859-1952.</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Experience.</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pragmatism.</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy, Modern 20th century.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1958</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dover Publications</style></publisher><urls></urls><research-notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articulation of the empirical or denotative method: begin with experience and end with experience as verification (see p. 7, 36).  It is holistic in nature (9).  Nature and experience belong together -- this is the essence of Dewey&apos;s naturalism (21).  The fallacies of philosophy: 1) complete separation of subject and object; 2) &quot;the exageration of the features of known objects at the expense of the qualities of objects of enjoyment...&quot; 3) &quot;the exclusive isolation of the results of various types of selective simplification which are undertaken for diverse unavowed purposes&quot; (32).  Philosophy as critique of prejudices (37); Choice is operative in reflection, it should not be concealed (28-9).&#xD;&#xD;Chapter 2: existence includes the stable and the precarious (41).  This gives rise to various philosophical attempts to secure the unstable and exhalt the stable.  Nice formulation: &quot;We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet indeterminate&quot; (47).  &#xD;&#xD;Aristotle has a naturalistic metaphysics, but does not go far enough (48-9).  He surrenders to the fixed, certain and finished.  He is, however, openly pluralistic.  Philosophy arises because of the mixture of the assured and uncertain (59).  Denotative method recognizes that reflective thinking illuminates, but it is also always contextual (67).&#xD;&#xD;See notes in notebook, July 12th, 2006.</style></research-notes></record></Cite></EndNote>John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 48.

[6]  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Dewey</Author><Year>1958</Year><RecNum>706</RecNum><Pages>170-171</Pages><record><database name="CPL.enl" path="C:\Documents and Settings\Chris Long\My Documents\Professional\EndNote\CPL.enl">CPL.enl</database><source-app name="EndNote" version="8.0">EndNote</source-app><rec-number>706</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dewey, John</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Experience and nature</style></title></titles><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">443</style></pages><keywords><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dewey, John, 1859-1952.</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Experience.</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pragmatism.</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy, Modern 20th century.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1958</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dover Publications</style></publisher><urls></urls><research-notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articulation of the empirical or denotative method: begin with experience and end with experience as verification (see p. 7, 36).  It is holistic in nature (9).  Nature and experience belong together -- this is the essence of Dewey&apos;s naturalism (21).  The fallacies of philosophy: 1) complete separation of subject and object; 2) &quot;the exageration of the features of known objects at the expense of the qualities of objects of enjoyment...&quot; 3) &quot;the exclusive isolation of the results of various types of selective simplification which are undertaken for diverse unavowed purposes&quot; (32).  Philosophy as critique of prejudices (37); Choice is operative in reflection, it should not be concealed (28-9).&#xD;&#xD;Chapter 2: existence includes the stable and the precarious (41).  This gives rise to various philosophical attempts to secure the unstable and exhalt the stable.  Nice formulation: &quot;We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet indeterminate&quot; (47).  &#xD;&#xD;Aristotle has a naturalistic metaphysics, but does not go far enough (48-9).  He surrenders to the fixed, certain and finished.  He is, however, openly pluralistic.  Philosophy arises because of the mixture of the assured and uncertain (59).  Denotative method recognizes that reflective thinking illuminates, but it is also always contextual (67).&#xD;&#xD;See notes in notebook, July 12th, 2006.</style></research-notes></record></Cite></EndNote>Ibid.,170-71.

[7]  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Randall</Author><Year>1960</Year><RecNum>222</RecNum><Pages>300</Pages><record><database name="CPL.enl" path="C:\Documents and Settings\Chris Long\My Documents\Professional\EndNote\CPL.enl">CPL.enl</database><source-app name="EndNote" version="8.0">EndNote</source-app><rec-number>222</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Randall, John Herman</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aristotle</style></title></titles><keywords><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aristotle</style></keyword><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">American Naturalism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1960</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Columbia University Press</style></publisher><call-num><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">B 485.R3 1960</style></call-num><label><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2320</style></label><urls></urls><research-notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This book treats of Aristotle&apos;s entire philosophy.  It sees Aristotle not as a systematic thinker (30), but as a &quot;thoroughgoing&quot; contextualist (66, 169ff), naturalist and functionalist.  By naturalist, Randall seems to mean that Aristotle seeks to explain everything by appealing to nature itself, even, following Santyana, when he turns to the unmoved mover (138ff).  The text seems at times to caricature Plato&apos;s thinking in terms of Platonism and follows Jaeger&apos;s understanding of Aristotle&apos;s development away from Plato in large part.  (This is less true at the end (cf., 297, 300), when Randall recognizes that Plato never abstracted from the world in his dialogues -- see Randall&apos;s own book on Plato).&#xD;&#xD;Randall&apos;s main suggestion is the important role language plays in Aristotle and the main missing dimension of his thinking: a thorough analysis of logos.  (Comment: A. seems to recognize that all is filtered through logos, so a thoroughgoing analysis of it might not have been possible).  Logos itself needs to be treated in biological or functional terms (102).  This is the missing dimension of the De Anima.  &#xD;&#xD;Science as right talking emphasizes that fact that science always operates through language (46).  It requires using language in a particular, connected fashion.&#xD;&#xD;Aristotle as open and growing, not systematic (24).&#xD;-- The spirit of Aristotle is an openness to the importance of fact, to the there of what is, the obstinancy of matter (245).&#xD;-- Beings are not exhausted by discourse (122).  Recourse must be made to a pointing.&#xD;-- Book Lambda is not the culmination of the Metaphysics (108).&#xD;-- Natural teleology is not design, always links to how beings exist in the world (227ff).&#xD;-- Aristotle&apos;s humility (142).&#xD;&#xD;Aristotle and Myth&#xD;-- Aristotle is often seen as different from Plato in the sober style of writing.  Randall recognized the language of myth in the De Anima regarding the active intellect (100ff), the unmoved mover (105) and the De Caelo (147).&#xD;&#xD;Logos and Life&#xD;-- These are the two dimensions of Aristotle&apos;s thinking, and they are often at odds with one another (60).  A formal analysis versus a functional analysis.  (Comment: This is pricisely the distinction that makes sense of the middle books of the Metaphysics).&#xD;-- For Aristotle, existence is determinate, ousia is encountered in its natural function (113).&#xD;&#xD;R. says that Aristotle is not like Kant in that A. does believe that nous can know things as they are (91).  While it may be true that Aristotle believes this, he was too much aware of the function of language to fall into a naivete about it.  See the discussion of phantasia (95ff).  R. himself recognizes that Aristotle&apos;s view of the relationship between logos and things is too simple (300).&#xD;&#xD;{Comment: Perhaps this naivete, if that is what it is, concerning the relationship between logos and beings, is precisely what makes Aristotle&apos;s language so effective in laying bare that very relationship.  Aristotle&apos;s language illustrates precisely how difficult it is for things to go into language.  Or perhaps better: it illustrates how beings both go and do not go into language.}</style></research-notes></record></Cite></EndNote>John Herman Randall, Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 300.

[8]  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Heidegger</Author><Year>1986</Year><RecNum>173</RecNum><Pages>159</Pages><record><database name="CPL.enl" path="C:\Documents and Settings\Chris Long\My Documents\Professional\EndNote\CPL.enl">CPL.enl</database><source-app name="EndNote" version="8.0">EndNote</source-app><rec-number>173</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heidegger, Martin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sein und Zeit</style></title></titles><edition><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16th</style></edition><keywords><keyword><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heidegger</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1986</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tübingen</style></pub-location><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Max Niemeyer Verlag</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3-484-70122-6</style></isbn><label><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1760</style></label><urls></urls><research-notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ProCite field[13]: Sein und Zeit&#xD;ProCite field[21]: 1927</style></research-notes></record></Cite></EndNote>Martin Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit, 16th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986), 159.