**Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?**

Edmund L. Gettier

*NOTE: Originally published **in *Analysis *23 (1963),
pp. 121-3 (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1963).*

Various attempts have
been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's
knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be
stated in a form similar to the following:^{1}

(a) S knows that P *IFF* (i) P is true,

(ii)
S believes that P, and

(iii)
S is justified in believing that P.

For example, Chisholm has held that the following
gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge:^{2}

(b) S knows that P *IFF* (i) S accepts P,

(ii)
S has adequate evidence for P, and

(iii)
P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge
as follows:^{3}

(c) S knows that P *IFF* (i) P is true,

(ii) S is sure that P is true, and

(iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the
conditions stated therein do not constitute a *sufficient* condition for
the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show
that (b) and (c) fail if 'has adequate evidence for' or 'has the right to be
sure that' is substituted for 'is justified in believing that' throughout.

I
shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of 'justified' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition
of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing
a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is
justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q
as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. Keeping
these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases in which the conditions
stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time
false that the person in question knows that proposition.

*Case 1*:

* *Suppose that
Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has
strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

(d) Jones is the man
who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company
assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had
counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

(e) The man who will
get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and
accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this
case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is *true.*

But imagine, farther, that unknown
to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith,
he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e),
is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (*i*) (e) is true, (*ii* ) Smith
believes that (e) is true, and (*iii* )
Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that
Smith does not *know* that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the
number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are
in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in
Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.

*Case 2:*

Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the
following proposition:

(f)
Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past
within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just
offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has
another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith
selects three place-names quite at random, and constructs the following three
propositions:

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;

(h) Either Jones owns a
Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;

(i)
Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith
realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by
(f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the
basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i)
from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore
completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of
course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that
two further conditions hold. First, Jones does *"not* own a Ford, but
is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence,
and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens
really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith
does not know that (h) is true, even though (*i** *) (h) *is* true, (*ii *) Smith does relieve that (h) is true, and (*iii*) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.

These two
examples show that definition (a) does not state a sufficient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with
appropriate changes, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor
definition (c) do so either.

1. Plato seems to be considering some such
definition at *Theaetetus* 201, and perhaps
accepting one at

*Meno* 98.

2*.* Roderick M. Chisholm, *Perceiving: a
Philosophical Study,* Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New

York, 1957), p. 16.

3. *A. ].* Ayer, *The**
Problem of Knowledge,* Macmillan (London, 1956), p. 34.