“Bourdieu and the Social Conditions of Wittgensteinian Language Games.” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy 11, n1 (1996): 15-21.
Bourdieu and the Social Conditions of Wittgensteinian Language Games
Introduction: Language Games and Relations of Power
Pierre Bourdieu is a contemporary French sociologist who has written extensively on language and society. On one level, his work can be seen as providing an extension on the later Wittgenstein’s treatment of language games. I have elsewhere stressed an interpretation of Wittgenstein that views him as facilitating applied philosophy. In this paper, I intend to apply to the philosophy of language some of the main contributions in Bourdieu’s major work that has recently been translated as Language and Symbolic Power. I wish to argue that ordinary language philosophers have not paid sufficient attention to the social conditions that regulate the use of language. In Bourdieu’s terms, “The use of language ...depends on the social position of the speaker;” hence, the authority of language “comes to language from outside.” This “outside” is composed of the social conditions within which language games are situated.
From my own study of language I have come to the conclusion that speaking is inseparable from the distribution of power in a society. In all the cases with which I am familiar, the distribution of power in society is unequal. Consequently, the analysis of language games should not be separated from an awareness of social classes and of the relative social position of speakers. In this regard, as John Thompson notes in his commentary on Bourdieu, the institutionalized social relations of speaking establish “who is authorized to speak and recognized as such by others.” While I take this view as my point of departure, I am not a linguistic determinist. (I think that the work of feminists such as Deborah Cameron provide a very solid basis for rejecting lingusitic determinism.) Nevertheless, although I am not a linguistic determinist, I recognize that the possibility of foregoing linguistic advantage is generally abandoned in favor of utilizing the power it provides.
To introduce Bourdieu and the relevance of his investigations for the philosophy of language, I will provide three sections. First, I will discuss the symbolic violence of legitimate discourse. Second, I will address the linguistic role of educational systems in legitimating inequality. Third, I will turn to the topic of heretical subversion of legitimate discourse and the obstacles which usually manage to neutralize it. Finally, in my conclusion, I will offer a few thoughts on the prospects for reducing linguistic violence by changing the words and rules of language games.
I. The Symbolic Violence of Legitimate Discourse
Bourdieu was born in southern France in 1930 and studied philosophy at the École normale supérieure in Paris in the late 1940s and early 1950s. He subsequently shifted to empirical studies in anthropology and sociology. Currently, he is Professor of Sociology at the Collège de France and Director of the Centre de sociologie européenne. Within sociology, Bourdieu quickly became dissatisfied with Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist method. His dissatisfaction with the structuralist foundations of Lévi-Strauss’s method led Bourdieu to study its origins within Saussurian linguistics and to expose the inherent limitations of Saussure’s structural linguistics as well.
In place of referring to language in general, Bourdieu cites specific social contexts which he calls “fields,” “markets,” and “games.” Hence, at the least, a superficial connection to Wittgenstein is easy to see. For Bourdieu, we always act in specific social contexts. However, each field has distinctive ways of designating and relating its various forms of capital which, in turn, shape the perpetual struggle by individuals within it to maintain or alter the distribution of its forms of capital.
Bourdieu’s discussion of types of capital, of course, represents a departure from Wittgenstein. Specifically, Bourdieu refers to: 1) economic capital composed of material wealth; 2) cultural capital derived from knowledge and skill; and 3) symbolic capital based on prestige and honor. (This discussion of capital is very close to but independent of the work by Rossi-Landi.) In this regard, Bourdieu argues that language is not only a means of communication but also a medium of power. In various ways, as the title of his book suggests, language provides symbolic power. Often, Bourdieu describes the symbolic power of language as a form of symbolic violence.
An inverse relation often exists between possession of symbolic power and use of physical violence. While the exercise of power is common in everyday social life, persons with authority generally do not have to exercise overt physical force. Instead, as Thompson notes, “Violence is ... built into the institution itself.” What Garver terms overt personal and especially overt institutional violence are minimized by the “legitimate” state. However, Bourdieu is not naive concerning how this reduction in physical violence occurs. Usually, violence is transformed into a symbolic form that is similar to Garver’s covert personal and especially covert institutional violence. At the level of the state, Bourdieu goes so far as to say, “Language ... is no doubt the principal support of the dream of absolute power.” Fortunately, as John Wesley Young has shown, even the sophisticated efforts by the most extreme twentieth-century totalitarian regimes to control language have not been successful. Nevertheless, regardless of the degree to which the state linguistically attains absolutism, symbolic power endows individuals within its various markets with a legitimacy that otherwise would not be possessed.
In a manner that goes well beyond Saussure, Bourdieu gives primacy to linguistic markets over the system of language (langue). “Language” as such is not what is in circulation. Instead, discourses that are stylistically marked in their production and in their reception are circulated. Bourdieu maintains that linguistic utterances are always produced in particular markets and that the properties of these markets are what establish the “value” of these linguistic utterances. As a consequence, within each market, some linguistic products are valued more than others. Competence within a market refers to the ability to produce utterances which are valued within that market. In speaking, individuals draw on their accumulated linguistic resources and adapt their words and forms of speech to the respective markets in which they participate. For this reason, every linguistic interaction reflects the social structure.
Relative to each market, the degree to which an individual can exploit it to their advantage is a function of their level of linguistic capital within that market. One consequence of individuals tailoring their discourse to markets is that speakers are involved in a type of active complicity. As Bourdieu says, “The language of authority never governs without the collaboration of those it governs, without the help of the social mechanisms capable of producing this complicity, based on misrecognition, which is the basis of all authority.” Such linguistic self-censorship provides legitimacy to the distribution of power within markets.
II. The Linguistic Role of Educational Systems in Legitimating Inequality
Bourdieu’s discussion of system legitimation draws on both Weber and Habermas. However, he goes beyond both in bringing out the violence of legitimate discourse. As Bourdieu notes, “Legitimate works thus exercise a violence which protects them from the violence which would be needed if we were to perceive the expressive interest which they express only in forms which deny it: the histories of art, literature and philosophy testify to the efficacy of strategies of the imposition of form through which consecrated works impose the terms of their own perception.” He then adds, “Symbolic violence can only be exercised by the person who exercises it, and endured by the person who endures it, in a form which results in its misrecognition as such, in other words, which results in its recognition as legitimate.”
At the outset, Bourdieu addresses the relation of an official language to the imposition of political unity. He begins with the illusion of linguistic communism. By linguistic communism, he means the view that all members of society share the wealth of their language equally and freely. In this regard, he provides a critique of Chomsky. In his work, Chomsky primarily addresses linguistic competence as if it were equally distributed among speakers. He does not address the “economic and social conditions of the acquisition of the legitimate competence.”
To show Chomsky’s limitation, Bourdieu reassesses the status of Saussure’s langue. Speaking “the language,” “is tacitly to accept the official definition of the official language of a political unit. ... The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses.” The formation of a single “linguistic community” is the product of political domination. This linguistic community is then reproduced by institutions that impose recognition of the dominant language. Mahmou Dhaouadi has shown the effects of the imposition of Western languages onto developing counties. In an even broader study, Thomas Eriksen has considered the consequences of linguistic hegemony in many areas around the globe and has proposed several strategies for dealing with this problem.
From Bourdieu, Dhaouadi, and Eriksen, one sees clearly that the establishment and maintenance of an official language is closely connected with social classes. Lower classes are often limited to a local dialect. Because upper classes have access to official language, they are able to function as intermediaries. According to Bourdieu, “Promotion of official language to the status of the national language gave them that de facto monopoly of politics.” In this process the education system plays a key role. Educational institutions control the code governing the written language that is termed “correct” language. Spoken language is regarded as “implicitly inferior.” Educational systems have “helped to devalue popular modes of expression, dismissing them as ‘slang’ and ‘gibberish,’ ... and to impose recognition of the legitimate language.”
For Bourdieu, “All linguistic practices are measured against the legitimate practices,” and “legitimate practices” are defined as “the practices of those who are dominant.” A similar point is made by Nietzsche in his Genealogy of Morals. However, linguistic understanding needs to be distinguished from linguistic attention. Most people have the capacity to understand discourse. Fewer people get “listened to.” This point is well illustrated in an essay by Carol Cohn in which she notes that unless she spoke the technostrategic language of defense intellectuals, her “voice” was not heard in their discussions.
Linguistic competence yields linguistic capital. With linguistic capital, one can obtain “a profit of distinction on the occasion of each social exchange.” Such profit is distributed on the basis of one’s position in the social structure. A deviational hierarchy in forms of speaking is almost universally accepted as legitimate. In this regard, Bourdieu stresses the “unequal distribution of chances of access to the means of production of the legitimate competence.” In other words, society restricts linguistic opportunity. The ones who possess it “impose it as the only legitimate one in formal markets.” Linguistic alienation is one further consequence of differentiations in linguistic capital across markets. For this reason, since linguistic alienation is a form of linguistic violence, speaking cannot be separated from linguistic violence.
The educational system’s influence goes even further to a monopoly on the “large-scale production of producers/consumers” of different languages. Educational systems largely influence the reproduction of linguistic markets and their relative social value. The impact of educational systems on linguistic markets and their value are the result of its control over the “instruments of correction.” The method used by educational systems is to establish the “correct” by simply “correcting” the speech and writing of students.
Bourdieu contends that “the educational market is strictly dominated by the linguistic products of the dominant class and tends to sanction the pre-existing differences in capital.” Bourdieu does not say that only the children of the dominant class are admitted into the best schools. Instead, he suggests that to enter or finish programs at top schools one generally has the legitimate language imposed on them. The structure of class relations sets the “structure of chances of access to the educational system.” By defining qualifications and credentials, educational systems both create and sustain inequalities. As a result, educational systems contribute to the legitimation of the established order. Thompson observes that, for Bourdieu, the educational system is “a mechanism for creating and sustaining inequalities, in such a way that the recourse to overt force is unnecessary. ... It enables those who benefit most from the system to convince themselves of their own intrinsic worthiness, while preventing those who benefit least from grasping the basis of their own deprivation.”
Later, Bourdieu makes a similar point about the relation of language to social power when he exposes rites as setting arbitrary boundaries. He observes, “all rites tend to consecrate or legitimate an arbitrary boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of the limit and encouraging a recognition of it as legitimate. ... Rites draw the attention of the observer to the passage (whence the expression ‘rite of passage’), whereas the important thing is the line.”” Bourdieu also exposes what is hidden in most rites, namely, the complement to the class of the initiated. “There is thus a hidden set of individuals in relation to which the instituted group is defined.” The key contrast is not between those being initiated and others who have yet to reach the age for or fulfill the conditions of initiation, but with those who will never qualify.
On this basis, we can come to see the extent to which admission to and degrees from educational institutions are granted on the basis of rites which typically conceal their arbitrary character. Bourdieu regards rites, whether religious or educational, as a form of social magic. “The act of institution is an act of social magic that can create difference ex nihilo, or ... more often ... by exploiting ... pre-existing differences.” These rites work best when they appear to be based on objective differences. As Bourdieu puts it, “Social magic always manages to produce discontinuity out of continuity.”
III. Heretical Subversion and Its Obstacles
In his treatment of description and prescription, Bourdieu addresses language and the social world, especially how groups are constituted and transformed. “One can act on the social world by acting on their knowledge of this world,” since, as Bourdieu notes, language is used for “producing, reproducing or destroying the representations that make groups visible for themselves and for others.” Still, dominated groups can move from imposed classification to politics by denunciation. “The social order owes some measure of its permanence to the fact that it imposes schemes of classification which ... produce a form of recognition of this order. ... Politics begins, strictly speaking, with the denunciation of this tacit contract of adherence to the established order which defines the original doxa.”
Bourdieu uses the term “heretical subversion” to describe this process. Heretical subversion works by exploiting “the possibility of changing the social world by changing the representation of this world.” Basically, speakers can articulate alternative descriptions. In this regard, the practice of heretical subversion is similar to what Rorty means by abnormal or edifying discourse.
In Bourdieu’s terms, “The performative utterance, the political pre-vision, is in itself a pre-diction which aims to bring about what it utters. It contributes practically to the reality of what it announces by the fact of uttering it, of pre-dicting it and making it pre-dicted, of making it conceivable and above all credible and thus creating the collective representation and will which contribute to its production.” Because of tacit legitimations of linguistic markets in self-censored speech and of explicit challenges to linguistic markets in heretical subversion, no area of discourse or knowledge is politically neutral. (A similar point is made by V. N. Voloshinov when he argues that all language is ideologically charged.) All discourse relates, on one level, to power struggles in which some seek to perpetuate the dominant consensus and others seek to transform it.
Heretical subversion and the establishment’s resistance to it involves social struggle. At this point, Bourdieu sounds rather Marxist. For Bourdieu, “struggle lies ... at the very root of the construction of the class (social, ethnic, sexual, etc): every group is the site of a struggle to impose a legitimate principle of group construction. ... Indeed, any attempt to institute a new division must reckon with the resistance of those who, occupying a dominant position in the space thus divided, have an interest in perpetuating a doxic relation to the social world which leads to the acceptance of established divisions as natural or to their symbolic denial through the affirmation of a higher unity (national, familial, etc).” Bourdieu makes this point succinctly when he observes that “The propulsive force of heretical criticism is met by the resistant force of orthodoxy.”
To gain voice and authority both establishment groups and heretical groups must rely on delegation. The act of delegation can be seen easily when one person delegates to one other person. However, as Bourdieu notes, “When a single person is entrusted with the powers of a whole crowd of people, that person can be invested with a power which transcends each of the individuals who delegate him.” “In appearance the group creates the man who speaks in its place and in its name ... whereas in reality it is more or less just as true to say that it is the spokesperson who creates the group.”
The issue of political fetishism is generally concealed, as Marx noted in Capital. For Bourdieu, “individuals ... cannot constitute themselves (or be constituted) as a group ... unless they dispossess themselves in favour of a spokesperson. One must always risk political alienation in order to escape from political alienation.” As Bourdieu notes, “Delegates and ministers ... are, according to Marx’s formula about fetishism, among those ‘products of the human brain [which] appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own.’” Bourdieu further observes that “Political idolatry consists precisely in the fact that the value which resides in the political personality ... appears as a mysterious objective property of the person, a charm, charisma.” Of course, such fetishism can also occur in relation to language, which, as Ranjit Chatterjee notes, was Wittgenstein’s point in suggesting the danger of making language an idol, as has happened in much ordinary language philosophy.
The self-consecration of the delegate also needs to be noted. Delegation is a usurpation. Bourdieu observes, “Usurpation already exists potentially in delegation.” The delegate speaks in the place of others, but the delegate is not a true servant. According to Bourdieu, “There is a sort of structural bad faith attached to the delegate who, in order to appropriate for himself the authority of the group, must identify himself with the group, reduce himself to the group which authorizes him.” In this regard, Bourdieu draws on, yet extends, Sartre’s treatment of bad faith.
For Bourdieu, Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity can also be read as a critique of delegation. Bourdieu observes that “These priestly strategies are all based on bad faith, in the Sartrean sense of the term: lying to oneself, that ‘sacred lie’ by which the priest decides the value of things by declaring that things are good absolutely when they are good for him: the priest, says Nietzsche, is the one who ‘calls his own will God.’ (The same could be said of the politician when he calls his own will ‘people’, ‘opinion’ or ‘nation.’)” Such behavior seems to occur regardless of where one is located on the political continuum. This point can be seen quite clearly in the behavior of political delegates in the transition from Soviet communists to Russian democrats. Bourdieu captures this similar behavior when he suggests that “What Nietzsche means is that delegates base universal values on themselves, appropriate values, ‘requisition morality’, and thus monopolize the notions of God, Truth, Wisdom, People, Message, Freedom, etc.”
Conclusion: Changing Language and Reducing Linguistic Violence
Near the end of the book, Bourdieu addresses classification as struggle. In viewing classification as convention, Bourdieu rejects the view of classification as natural. Bourdieu observes, “Nobody would want to claim today that there exist criteria capable of founding ‘natural’ classifications, ... ‘reality’, in this case, is social through and through and the most ‘natural’ classifications are based on characteristics which are not in the slightest respect natural and which are to a great extent the product of an arbitrary imposition.” The very arbitrariness of classifications, however, opens the door for change. Bourdieu is close to Berger and Luckmann in seeing that in a very real sense, social reality is constructed by the members of society. While elite groups have structured social reality in their own interests, dominated groups can reconstruct it in a manner that brings about a more equitable distribution of power.
Nevertheless, to a large extent, Bourdieu is like Wittgenstein in primarily describing how language games are played. However, as I have noted, he indicates linguistic points where dominated groups can exercise leverage. Still, he stops short of advocating that there are ways to get around the relations of power imposed by language. Despite his primarily descriptive orientation, by noting that such mechanisms exist Bourdieu implicitly suggests, contra Weber, that we need not remain trapped in the “iron cage” that others have constructed for us. The discourse of heretical subversion can expose the system of representations as non-natural (as arbitrary conventions like Foucault’s epistemes) and, for this reason, can pursue alternative structures. According to Bourdieu, in arming themselves with knowledge of these mechanisms, persons can find “in the knowledge of the probable, not an incitement to fatalistic resignation or irresponsible utopianism, but the foundations for a rejection of the probable based on the scientific mastery of the laws of production governing the eventuality rejected.” In other words, we need not give into “fatalistic resignation;” linguistic change that can foster a more equitable distribution of power is not an “irresponsible utopianism.”
More in line with Rossi-Landi and other more radical theorists, I maintain we can and should change our language. Bourdieu aids in this task by making us more aware of the obstacles we face. Still, the political labor remains. An approach to language games inspired by Bourdieu can allow the Wittgensteinian doing applied philosophy to describe how words in various language games are forms of linguistic violence and how the rules of these language games sustain arbitrary social inequalities. Then, in moving from understanding to action, philosophers and others can work to change these words and rules.
 Several of Bourdieu’s books and essays have been translated. Besides his main work, which I cite in note 4, the primary books that have been translated are the following: Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Homo Academicus, trans. P. Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); The Logic of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); In Other Words: Essays toward a Reflexive Sociology, trans. M. Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, trans. P. Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), and The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958).
 Cf. my essay, “From Wittgenstein To Applied Philosophy,” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy 9, n1 (Summer/Fall 1994), pp. 15-20.
 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. and intro. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). This text, which is a translation of Ce que parler veut dire: l’économie des échanges linguistiques (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1982), omits two short essays and adds five others. All subsequent references in notes to Bourdieu are to this text.
 Ibid., p. 109.
 Ibid., p. 9.
 Cf. my essays, “Merleau-Ponty on Language and Social Science: The Dialectic of Phenomenology and Structuralism,” Man and World 12 (1979), pp. 322-338 and “Analogy and Metaphor: Two Models of Linguistic Creativity,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 7 (1980), pp. 299-317.
 Deborah Cameron, Feminism and Linguistic Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
 Cf. my essay, “Nuclear Discourse and Linguistic Alienation,” Journal of Social Philosophy 18, n2 (Summer 1987), pp. 42-49. Cf. also Talbot J. Taylor, “Which is to be master? The institutionalization of authority in the science of language,” Ideologies of Language, ed. John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 9-26.
 Bourdieu, p. 252.
 Ibid., p. 3.
 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in general linguistics, eds. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959).
 Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Linguistics and Economics (The Hague: Mouton, 1977); Language as Work & Trade: A Semiotic Homology for Linguistics & Economics, trans. Martha Adams et al (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1983; “On Linguistic Money,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 7 (1980), pp. 346-72; and “Ideas for the Study of Linguistic Alienation,” Social Praxis 3 (1-2), pp. 77-92.
 Bourdieu, p. 24.
 Newton Garver, “What Violence Is,” The Nation 209 (June 24, 1968). pp. 817-822. Cf. James C. Scott, “Prestige as the Public Discourse of Domination,” Cultural Critique 12 (Spring 1989), pp. 145-166.
 Bourdieu, p. 42.
 John Wesley Young, Totalitarian Language: Orwell’s Newspeak and Its Nazi and Communist Antecedents (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1991), esp. pp. 12-18.
 Cf. Rossi-Landi, Linguistics and Economics.
 Bourdieu, p. 113.
 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), pp. 122-176. [Economy and Society, trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al and ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 212-307.] Jürgen Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973. [Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.]
 Bourdieu, p. 139.
 Ibid., p. 140.
 Ibid., p. 43.
 Cf. Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
 Bourdieu, p. 44.
 Ibid., p. 45.
 Ibid., p. 46.
 Mahmou Dhaouadi, “An Operational Analysis of the Phenomenon of the Other Underdevelopment in the Arab World and in the Third World,” International Sociology 3, n3 (Sept. 1988), pp. 219-234.
 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Linguistic Hegemony and Minority Resistance,” Journal of Peace Research 29, n3 (1992), pp. 313-332.
 Bourdieu p. 47.
 Ibid., p. 48.
 Ibid., p. 49.
 Ibid., p. 53.
 Frederich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956).
 Bourdieu, p. 55.
 Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” Exposing Nuclear Phallacies, ed. Diana Russell (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon, 1989), pp. 127-159.
 Bourdieu, p. 55.
 Cf. James C. Scott, “Prestige as the Public Discourse of Domination,” Cultural Critique 12 (Spring 1989), pp. 145-166.
 Bourdieu, p. 56.
 Cf. my essay, “Linguistic Violence,” Institutional Violence, eds. Robert Litke and Deane Curtin (Amsterdam: Rodopi, forthcoming in 1996).
 Bourdieu, p. 57.
 Ibid., p. 61.
 Ibid., p. 62.
 Ibid., p. 64.
 Ibid., pp. 24-25
 Ibid. p. 118.
 Cf. Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools (New York: HarperPerennial, 1992).
 Bourdieu, pp. 119-120.
 Ibid., p. 120.
 Alfred Schutz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (Vienna: Springer-Verlag, 1960). [The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1967).]
 Bourdieu, p. 127.
 Ibid., p. 128.
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 360 and 365-366.
 Bourdieu, p. 128.
 V. N. Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik (New York: Seminar Press, 1973.
 Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), pp. 469-500.
 Bourdieu, p. 128.
 Ibid., p. 131.
 Ibid., p. 203.
 Ibid., p. 204.
 Karl Marx, “Capital, Volume One,” The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 319-329.
 Bourdieu, p. 204.
 Ibid., p. 205.
 Ranjit Chatterjee, “Rossi-Landi’s Wittgenstein: ‘A philosopher’s meaning is his use in the culture,’ “ Semiotica 84, n3/4 (1991), pp. 275-283.
 Bourdieu, p. 209.
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968), esp. Pt. 1, Ch. 2.
 Cf. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals.
 Bourdieu, p. 210.
 Cf. William Gay and T. A. Alekseeva, Capitalism with a Human Face: The Quest for a Middle Road in Russian Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
 Bourdieu, pp. 210-211.
 Ibid., p. 222.
 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).
 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft., pp. 551-579. [Economy and Society, pp. 956-1005.]
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970). Cf. Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p. 238.
 Bourdieu, p. 136.
 Aldous Huxley, “Words and Behaviour,” The Olive Tree (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1937); Haig A. Bosmajian, The Language of Oppression (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983).