William Gay, “Nuclear Warfare and
Morality,” Global Studies Encyclopedia, eds. I.I. Mazour, A.N. Chumakov, and
W.C. Gay (Moscow: Raduga, 2003),
pp. 3740377.
Nuclear Warfare and Morality
UNC Charlotte
In
each decade of the nuclear age, philosophers have provided critical reflections
on the nature, use, and consequences of nuclear weapons. Frequently, these
reflections have addressed the morality of producing, testing, deploying, and
using nuclear weapons. Already,
these philosophical reflections have passed through four phases and are now
entering a fifth phase. The first
phase stretches from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to the above-ground
nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll.
From the initial use of atomic weapons in 1945 to the testing of the
hydrogen bomb in 1952, the United States held a virtual monopoly. (The Soviet Union tested its first
atomic weapon in 1949, and the United States progressed not only to the
development of the hydrogen bomb, but also to a miniaturization of nuclear
weapons that spawned even more tactical nuclear weapons than the eventual
strategic arsenals of the superpowers.)
During the 1950s and 1960s, the second phase shifts to a focus on the
above-ground testing of the hydrogen bomb, as well as the post-war tension
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The third phase addresses
increasing shifts during the 1970s and 1980s to counterforce weapons and
nuclear war fighting strategies. The fourth phase responds to the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in 1991 and to the problems of nuclear proliferation and
nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War world, culminating with a critique of
the renewal of Star Wars in 2001 under the guise of ballistic missile
defense. The first decade of the
twenty-first century ushers in not only the purported “war against
terrorism” by the United States, but also a broader and deeper
philosophical response to the interconnections among violence, terrorism, and
war.
Before
proceeding to a discussion of each of these phases of philosophical response,
three points need to be made about nuclear weapons and nuclear war. First, nuclear weapons undercut the
traditional distinction between military combatants and civilian
noncombatants. The strategy of
nuclear deterrence is based on the claim that nuclear war is prevented by
making the cost of nuclear war prohibitively high. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, popularly known
by its acronym MAD, is the primary symbol of this dangerous calculus. Of course, as is well known by nuclear
planners and government officials, if deterrence fails noncombatants will be
the primary victims and just war principles of proportionality and
discrimination will be blown apart along with the destruction of civilian
populations. Second, because of
radioactive fallout, the use of nuclear weapons entails the precipitation of
ecological warfare. The results of
the use of nuclear weapons cannot be contained within the territorial
boundaries of the fighting nations and will adversely affect not only innocent
lives around the globe but also the fragile ecosystem of the entire
planet. Third, nuclear war is a
contingent event; it is neither necessary nor impossible. Hence, neither resignation to nor
denial of nuclear war is logical.
Our actions are relevant to the probability of nuclear war. Hence, to paraphrase Immanuel Kant,
since hope of avoiding nuclear war is possible, we have a moral responsibility
to work against its occurrence.
Our knowledge
about nuclear war is based on three primary sources: 1) studies of actual nuclear weapons tests (including the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki); 2) projections on limited and full-scale
nuclear war, which normally extrapolate casualties and damage to military and
industrial bases, 3) computer simulations and speculative models on possible
catastrophic consequences. In
considering the possible consequences of nuclear war, a couple of points should
be stressed. First, a substantial
amount of our reasoning about nuclear war is conjectural. Of course, what we do know empirically
indicates that nuclear war is fundamentally distinct in character from
conventional war, particularly in its effects on survivors and the
environment. Finally, the
magnitude of the effects of the use of nuclear weapons makes comparisons of low
to high scenarios of damage less significant than the comprehension that even
limited nuclear war will have consequences significantly more severe than the
most severe effects of most conventional wars.
Conventional
and nuclear weapons differ in a variety of important ways. Although in a sense even a club or a
spear is a conventional weapon, the term “conventional weapon,”
when used in the technical military sense, refers to a device that can cause an
explosion. Both conventional and
nuclear weapons are alike in that they explode by rapidly releasing large
amounts of energy. Moreover, they
are alike in that each produces heat (increased temperature) and blast (shock
wave). Their distinction hinges on
the manner in which energy is released.
Whereas conventional weapons rely on chemical reactions in which the
atoms in the explosive material are simply rearranged, nuclear weapons rely on
the formation of different nuclei by means of subatomic reactions in which
protons and neutrons are redistributed.
Nuclear weapons release much more energy from much less mass than is the
case with conventional weapons, because the forces within nuclei are
tremendously greater than those between atoms. Fission of one pound of uranium or plutonium releases about
the same explosive energy as the explosion of 8,000 tons of TNT.
In order for nuclear reactions to result in an
explosion, the conversion of matter into energy needs to be
self-sustaining. The two types of
nuclear weapons are based on the two ways in which such chain reactions can be
obtained, i.e., the “fission” (splitting) of the heaviest atomic
nuclei (specifically uranium-235 and plutonium-239) and “fusion”
(joining) of the lightest atomic nuclei (specifically hydrogen isotopes). This second way is by means of
thermonuclear processes (that is, ones of very high heat) and the resulting
energy is even greater than that obtained from fission. The complete fusion of
one pound of the hydrogen isotope deuterium would release about the same
explosive energy as the explosion of 26,000 tons of TNT.
The other
characteristic of nuclear weapons, which makes them so qualitatively distinct,
is radiation. The familiar
mushroom cloud symbolizes the post-blast lethality of nuclear weapons. Contaminated debris is sucked up into
the atmosphere after a surface blast and falls back to earth as fallout. Whether exposure is to direct radiation
near the blast site or to fallout downwind from a surface blast, new factors
enter into the effects of war.
Beyond the initial phenomenon of radiation sickness (which can be
lethal), radiation causes long-range carcinogenic and mutagenic damage. Because cancer takes ten, twenty--even
forty--years to run its course, the carcinogenic effects of any nuclear
detonation last nearly half a century.
Mutagenic effects are even more far reaching, since the prospect of
genetic mutations in offspring may not appear for generations (because of
factors involving dominant and recessive genes). Until the close of World War II neither combatants nor
non-combatants had previously faced war in which the effects could literally be
passed on biologically to their descendants. Moreover, these carcinogenic and mutagenic effects, because
of the world-wide distribution of fallout, spill over into parts of the world
totally non-involved in the conflict.
Despite these
potential problems, nuclear weapons of different types have been designed on
the assumption that capability for distinct uses is militarily
significant. The terms
“strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons refer to
these distinct military uses and can be correlated with delivery systems and
targeting. Strategic weapons refer
to nuclear warheads or bombs delivered by intercontinental missiles,
intercontinental bombers, or submarines, and strategic weapons are normally of
a substantial size (in the megaton range). Until recent developments in the increased accuracy and
decreased size of such systems, the assumption was that targeting distinctions
could not be respected (i.e., between military and civilian attacks). Because of these developments, a
military distinction is now made between strategic counterforce and strategic
countervalue weapons. Tactical
weapons refer to smaller (in the kiloton range) weapons, ranging from nuclear
shells to intermediate range nuclear missiles, produced for use in battlefield
situations.
What are the results of these changes? For four decades the United States and
the Soviet Union kept their respective armed interventions from turning
nuclear; however, new generations of nuclear weapons, alterations of policies,
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have undercut the reliance on a by-gone
past as a guide to how nuclear states will respond to future conflicts. Unless and until the “firebreak”
between conventional and nuclear conflict is again crossed, the ability to wage
nuclear war remains in question.
In addition, insofar as ability and willingness to use nuclear weapons
in conflict is dubious, a further problem arises. Nuclear weapons function as a deterrent against aggression
only to the extent that the threat of their use is credible. Hence, much of the history of nuclear
weapons systems and policies is an endeavor to demonstrate that nuclear nations
have the capability for and, under specified conditions, commitment to use of
nuclear weapons.
In
the first phase of philosophical response, the theme of social responsibility
was proclaimed by several philosophers with international reputations. On August 8, 1945, only two days after
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and a day before the atomic bombing of
Nagasaki, Albert Camus was the first philosopher to voice ethical concern with
an essay in the underground resistance newspaper Combat.
On August 18, 1945, Bertrand Russell began his prolonged responses with
an essay in Forward. Also in 1945, Jean-Paul Sartre
responded with “La Fin de la Guerre” in Temps Modernes, and John Dewey published his seminal
essay “Dualism and the Split Atom” in The New Leader.
Teilhard de Chardin also made several contributions. Soon, philosophers began to consider
whether world government was now needed and feasible. The prominent philosophy journal Ethics published an essay by Emile
Benoit-Smullyan and a response by Joseph Neyer on this topic. In other forums, Bertrand Russell and A.C.
Ewing provided analyses of arguments about whether the atomic age mandated
world government for global security.
Finally, several philosophers stressed the prospect that nuclear war
could bring about the end of the human species. In particular, John Somerville began his numerous writings
on this topic in the late 1940s and continued to do so through each remaining
decade of the twentieth century.
During the initial phase, two works stand
out. First, in 1946 T.V. Smith, a
previous editor of Ethics
and a prolific contributor to the theory of democracy, published Atomic
Power and Moral Faith. This book was the first entire volume
by a philosopher to be devoted to reflection on nuclear weapons. Smith stresses the economic, military,
and social implications of atomic energy, provides a critique of religious and
political sectarianism in the atomic age, and issues an early call for
improving U.S.-Soviet relations.
Second, in 1948 Daniel S. Robinson published The Principles of
Conduct. This book updates and extends points he
made in earlier articles. Within
the field of applied philosophy (that largely languished until late in the
twentieth century), he presents concern about the atomic age as pre-eminent for
what he terms “political ethics” or what is termed
“international politics” in political science.
In
the second phase of philosophical response, debate on the extinction thesis
received increased attention and participants included several philosophical
luminaries. During the 1950s, the
earlier hope for international control of atomic weapons was displaced by the
harsh realities of the Cold War: the Baruch Plan had been rejected, the hydrogen
bomb had been developed, the Chinese Revolution had succeeded, and the Korean
War had begun. Against this
backdrop, in 1958 Bertrand Russell and Sidney Hook carried on a heated exchange
with each arguing from opposite extreme positions. Russell argued nuclear war would destroy all humanity, and
Hook argued Soviet communism would destroy all freedom. In the heat of their political fervor,
Russell lost sight of the fact that not all of humanity would surely perish in
a nuclear war, while Hook lost sight of the fact that no society, not even in
the Soviet Union, was completely devoid of freedom. Nevertheless, their extreme, though untenable premises, made
arguing for their conclusions rather easy. Russell, of course, was the philosopher who spoke most
extensively about the nuclear war throughout this period. He made a dramatic broadcast against
the hydrogen bomb for the BBC, initiated the anti-nuclear Pugwash movement,
contributed to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and in 1959 published his
classic Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare.
One of the most important practical
results of the criticisms by ethicists and scientists of above-ground nuclear
testing was negotiation and ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. In this regard, along with the
“Russell-Einstein Manifesto,” one of the compelling pleas to
protect the innocent from the fallout of above-ground nuclear testing, as well
as from the destruction of thermonuclear war, came in 1958 from Albert
Schweitzer in Peace or Atomic War? Nevertheless, the Cold warrior position
of Hook also had influential representatives, the most famous of whom was Karl
Jaspers who in 1958 published Dei Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen.
Like Hook, he advocated risking destruction of humanity in nuclear war
over the alternative of risking the loss of our “humanity” under
totalitarianism. Less known in
this phase are some of the metaphysical assessments of the nuclear age. Though a controversial figure because
of his brief affiliation with the Nazis, Martin Heidegger discusses the
metaphysics of nuclear weapons in several writings, and several philosophers,
particularly in the 1980s, have drawn on his argument that metaphysical
reflection on the nuclear age helps us diagnose our plight as would-be
controllers (and, potentially, destroyers) of the Earth. He criticizes the arrogance of
anthropocentrism and points to a type of nonviolent ecological vigilance in his
concept of the Hausfreund—friend
of the house of our earth.
Third
Phase of Moral Response: The
Emergence of Counterforce Strategy
The
third phase of philosophical response swelled into prominence because of
renewed public concern over the nuclear threat during the 1970s and 1980s. The American Academy of Sciences warned
of the dangers of ozone depletion from nuclear detonations, Physicians for
Social Responsibility declared the unmanageability of medical problems in a
post-attack environment, Jonathan Schell in 1982 in his famous anti-nuclear
manifesto The Fate of the Earth
used the term “second death” to refer to the meaning of
annihilating humanity in nuclear war, and Carl Sagan popularized the notion of
nuclear winter. With these
Apocalyptic prognostications, the extremes in arguing about nuclear war were
reached. John Somerville honed his
earlier argument by coining the term “omnicide”--the irreversible
extinction of all sentient life.
Beyond revisiting of the extinction thesis, philosophers in the 1970s
and especially 1980s produced a deluge of writings seeking to “counter
counterforce”--arguing against nuclear war-fighting policies and
first-strike weapons. Key journal
issues were published by Philosophy and Social Criticism (Gay, 1984) and Ethics (Hardin et al, 1985), and several
important anthologies were published, including Nuclear Weapons and the
Future of Humanity
(Cohen and Lee, 1984) and Nuclear War (Fox and Groarke, 1985). The two philosophers who published most extensively on these
topics (and, several times, in response to one another) were Douglas Lackey and
Gregory Kavka. Lackey’s main
work during this period is Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons (1984), and Kavka’s main work is Moral
Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence
(1987).
During
the fourth phase of philosophical response, philosophers turned their attention
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to the continued proliferation of
nation states with nuclear arsenals.
Even with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Steven Lee argued in 1993
in Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons that the threat of nuclear war continues. In the post-Cold War world, a strong
case persists concerning the immorality and imprudence of nuclear deterrence,
let alone nuclear war. Lee argues
for the delegitimization of nuclear weapons and, to achieve this goal, contends
war itself needs to be delegitimized.
Broader concerns of this type were addressed in 1994 in On the Eve of
the 21st Century, edited
by William Gay and T.A. Alekseeva; this book, in fact, was the first
collaborative work between Russian and American philosophers since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Both Russians and Americans criticize the persistence of Realpolitik and the morality of nuclear
deterrence. They also argue for
nonviolent approaches to national security. In addition, they reassess the future of socialism and role
of Russia in the post-Cold War world.
During this period, Concerned Philosophers for Peace, a North American
Philosophical Association, began publishing a Special Series on Philosophy of
Peace (POP), published by Rodopi with Joseph Kunkel as the General Editor.
The
final verdict on how philosophers and the world community will respond
ethically and politically to the prospects for increased nuclear proliferation
and the attendant threat of nuclear war remains to be seen. Nevertheless, a fifth phase of
philosophical response began to emerge following the attacks of September 11,
2001. Philosophers are beginning
the critical assessment of the connections among violence, terrorism, and
war. Increasingly, the argument is
being made that the differences among violence, terrorism, and war are more of
degree than of kind. The first
available response is a special double issue of Concerned Philosophers For
Peace Newsletter on
“Terrorism and War in the Twenty-First Century (Gay, 2001) The
POP Special Series is planning an entire volume devoted to the problem of
terrorism. In a new Special Series
published by Rodopi with William Gay as the General Editor, Russian and
American philosophers are exploring these issues and broader ones of the global
quest for justice. Philosophical
responses to violence, terrorism, war, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of
mass destruction likely will continue as long as the earth is plagued by these
sources of destruction and as long as philosophers are around to raise moral
questions. Given the persistence
of their moral critiques, philosophers likely will continue to side with the
victims of violence and injustice and to seek to advance a world that will
renounce nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Cohen,
Avner and Steven Lee, eds. Nuclear
Weapons and the Future of Humanity.
Totowa: Rowman &
Allenheld, 1984.
Committee
for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs, eds. Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical,
Medical and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. Trans. Eisei Ishikawa and David L.
Swain. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981.
Fox,
Michael Allen and Leo Groarke, eds.
Nuclear War:
Philosophical Perspectives.
New York: Peter Lang, 1985.
Gay,
William and Michael Pearson, The Nuclear Arms Race. Chicago: American Library Association, 1987.
Gay,
William, ed. Philosophy and the
Debate on Nuclear Weapons Systems and Policies, Philosophy and
Social Criticism
10, n3-4 (1984), 188 pp.
Gay,
William, ed. “Terrorism and
War in the Twenty-First Century,” Special Double Issue of Concerned
Philosophers For Peace Newsletter 21 (2001), pp. 1-40.
Gay,
William and T.A. Alekseeva, eds. Democracy
and the Quest for Justice: Russian
and American Perspectives.
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002.
Gay,
William and T.A. Alekseeva, eds. On
the Eve of the 21st Century: Perspectives of Russian and American Philosophers. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994.
Glasstone,
Samuel and Philip J. Dolan. The
Effects of Nuclear Weapons. 3rd
ed. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.
Hardin,
Russell et al., eds. Symposium
on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence, Ethics 95 (1985), 385 pp.
Jaspers,
Karl. The Future of Mankind. Trans. E.B. Ashton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
Kavka,
Gregory. Moral Paradoxes of
Nuclear Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Lackey,
Douglas. Moral Principles and
Nuclear Weapons. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allenheld, 1984.
Lee,
Steven, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Russell,
Bertrand. Common Sense and
Nuclear Warfare. London: Allen Unwin, 1959.
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